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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in United States v. Watts, 
which held that sentencing judges may consider conduct of which 
a defendant has previously been acquitted,1 evidenced a curious 
set of dissonances.  On the one hand, the Court represented its 
holding as a foregone conclusion, foreshadowed by the unified 
agreement of “[e]very other Court of Appeals [excepting the 
Ninth],” and dictated by the “clear implications of 
18 U.S.C. § 3661, the Sentencing Guidelines, and this Court’s 
decisions.”2  Indeed, so sure was the Court of Watts’s outcome 
that it decided the case without full briefing or oral argument.3  
On the other hand, when Watts was decided, the legitimacy of 
considering prior acquitted conduct in sentencing was hardly a 
venerable or entrenched institution.  Indeed, Watts placed the 
Court’s imprimatur on a sentencing practice that courts had 
approved only with carefully nuanced restraints merely twenty-
five years before.4 
Likewise, on the one hand, the Watts opinion was released to 
“virtually no attention.”5  On the other hand, the practice 
legitimated by the decision was controversial.  Before the 
 
1 United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 149 (1997) (per curiam). 
2 Id. 
3 See id. at 171 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
4 See, e.g., United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1972). 
5 Elizabeth E. Joh, Comment, “If It Suffices To Accuse”: United States v. Watts 
and the Reassessment of Acquittals, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 913 (1998). 
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decision came down, the U.S. Sentencing Commission had listed 
“developing options to limit the use of acquitted conduct at 
sentencing” as one of its “[p]riority issues for the 1996–97 
amendment cycle.”6  Moreover, the defense bar later reported “a 
growing chorus of outrage by judges across the nation at a 
sentencing system that treats alike conviction or acquittal, 
calling it ‘bizarre,’ ‘dangerous,’ and a ‘blatant injustice.’ ”7  The 
scholarly consensus, too, was universally skeptical of the 
practice’s prudence.  While Watts would receive little analysis, 
and most of that in the course of scholarly works on related 
topics,8 all the analysis it did receive was negative.9   
How did the Court come to nonchalantly ratify a relatively 
novel sentencing practice universally regarded by onlookers with 
opprobrium?10  The mystery extends beyond the four corners of 
 
6 Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,465 (July 2, 
1996). 
7 Amy Baron-Evans, Supreme Court OKs Acquitted Conduct, Sentencing 
Commission Invites Comment on Alternatives, CHAMPION, Mar. 1997, at 62, 62. 
8 See, e.g., Marguerite A. Driessen, Challenging the Irrelevant Acquittal, 11 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 331, 333 (2002) (using Watts as a case-study, proving the new 
irrelevance of acquittals in the criminal justice system); Peter Erlinder, “Doing 
Time” . . . After the Jury Acquits: Resolving the Post-Booker “Acquitted Conduct” 
Sentencing Dilemma, 18 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 79, 100 (2008) (arguing that 
Watts draws the line between admissible and inadmissible relevant conduct in the 
wrong place); Judge Nancy Gertner, Circumventing Juries, Undermining Justice: 
Lessons from Criminal Trials and Sentencing, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 419, 422 (1999) 
(criticizing Watts as a jury-undermining aspect of the Sentencing Guidelines); Amy 
D. Ronner, Punishment Meted Out for Acquittals: An Antitherapeutic Jurisprudence 
Atrocity, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 459 (1999).   
9 As an under-studied Supreme Court case, Watts spawned a small cottage 
industry of student notes.  These, too, were uniformly negative on the merits of 
sentencing a defendant on the basis of charges for which he had previously been 
acquitted.  For a representative sample, see, for example, Joh, supra note 5, at 890 
(criticizing Watts for failing to take into account the proper expressive meaning of 
acquittals); Jeff Nicodemus, Note, Watts v. United States: The Misguided Approval 
of a Sentencing Court’s Authority To Consider Acquitted Conduct During Sentencing, 
25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 437, 470 (1998) (arguing that treating an acquittal like a 
conviction is “unconscionable”); Marvin Sprouse, Note, A Sentence for Acquittal: The 
Supreme Court Holds That Sentences May Be Enhanced for “Conduct” for Which 
Persons Have Been Tried and Acquitted: United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633 
(1997), 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 963, 997 (1997) (characterizing Watts as “legal 
sophistry”); Sandra K. Wolkov, Note, Reasonable Doubt in Doubt: Sentencing and the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Watts, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 661, 680 (1998) 
(arguing that Watts fosters a “presumption of guilt”). 
10 Unlike those cases in which the approval of an unpopular practice is traced by 
some to ideology, Watts was a per curiam 7-2 decision, with one member of each 
ideological “wing” of the court penning a dissent. See Watts v. United States, 519 
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the Watts decision to the virtual unanimity of the courts of 
appeals—relied upon by the Watts Court—in favor of the use of 
prior acquitted conduct at sentencing.11  To what do we attribute 
this confluence of the circuits in favor of a practice characterized 
both by its novelty and, according to the scholarly consensus, its 
imprudence? 
This Article attempts to answer those questions both 
historically and theoretically.  On a historical level, it traces the 
heretofore unexamined course of the congressional, judicial, and 
administrative actions leading from a pre-1970s sentencing 
regime that viewed any use of extra-trial evidence in sentencing 
as constitutionally suspect to the 1997 case that embraced prior 
acquittal sentencing as a foregone conclusion.  On a more 
theoretical level, the Article traces the justification for prior 
acquittal sentencing to two doctrinal tensions: the differing goals 
of trials and sentencing and the semiotic gap between acquittal 
and innocence.  As outside forces exerted pressure on those two 
tensions, the case for prior acquittal sentencing grew more 
compelling.  In response, Congress twice chose to modify the 
statutory regime governing prior acquittal sentencing, codifying 
it in more categorical terms.  Each codification encouraged judges 
to mechanize their use of prior acquitted conduct at sentencing, 
at times leading to instances of prior acquittal sentencing 
blatantly at odds with the regime’s underlying logic.  The 
Sentencing Guidelines continued that mechanization, effectively 
rendering the use of prior acquitted conduct at sentencing 
automatic. 
In the wake of Booker and Watts, however, judges have a 
new opportunity to reassert discretion in the area of prior 
acquittal sentencing.  This Article concludes by exhorting 
 
U.S. 148 (1997) (per curiam); id. at 159 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 170 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
11 Id. at 149 n.1 (majority opinion) (citing United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 
635–36 (D.C. Cir. 1992)); United States v. Milton, 27 F.3d 203, 208–09 (6th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Coleman, 947 F.2d 1424, 1428–29 (10th Cir. 1991); United 
Sates v. Averi, 992 F.2d 765, 765–66 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rodriguez-
Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177, 180–82 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Fonner, 920 F.2d 
1330, 1332–33 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Dawn, 897 F.2d 1444, 1449–50 (8th 
Cir. 1990); United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13, 16–17 (1st Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 608–09 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Isom, 886 F.2d 
736, 738–39 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d 747, 748–49 
(5th Cir. 1989).  
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sentencing judges to do so actively by: (1) scrutinizing evidence of 
prior acquitted conduct for indicia of reliability and (2) balancing 
the good of accuracy in sentencing with the compelling public 
policy reasons weighing against any introduction of prior 
acquitted conduct at sentencing.   
In so arguing, the Article proceeds as follows:  Part I begins 
the history of prior acquittal sentencing at the Watts decision’s 
clearest progenitor, Williams v. New York,12 the first American 
case to hold that extra-trial evidence may be used at sentencing.  
The Williams decision is notable in two respects.  First, Williams 
reveals the underlying logic justifying prior acquittal sentencing: 
because sentencing’s aims require broad truth-seeking, prior 
acquittal sentencing is defensible in the narrow set of cases 
where a prior acquittal indicates not innocence but merely a 
failure by the prosecution to meet an exacting burden of proof.  
Second, Williams provides one potential model on which a prior 
acquittal sentencing regime could be patterned.  That is, 
Williams held that extra-trial evidence is not per se excluded at 
sentencing, but did not extend blanket approval to all uses of 
prior acquitted conduct at sentencing.  The minimalism of that 
holding had the dual effect of: (1) emphasizing the existence of 
judicial discretion not to consider prior acquitted conduct at 
sentencing and (2) leaving later sentencing courts open to as-
applied challenges of their use of prior acquitted conduct in 
sentencing.  In so doing, it indirectly forced courts to consider the 
logical justifications for prior acquittal sentencing and 
encouraged them to scrutinize external indicia of reliability.  
Part II examines the first of the changes that altered the 
Williams baseline: the passage of 18 U.S.C. § 3577, the 1970 
statute affirming the use of prior acquitted conduct in 
sentencing, on which the Watts Court based much of its decision.  
Through a detailed analysis of the heretofore unexamined 
legislative and enaction history of § 3577, Part II identifies the 
passage of § 3577 as a congressional backlash against the use of 
the rules of evidence for purposes other than ensuring the 
reliability of evidence presented in court.  This backlash was 
stimulated, the legislative history will show, both by the 
corruption of the legal system by organized crime and by the new 
evidentiary rules formulated by the Warren Court during its 
 
12 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
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“criminal procedure revolution”—particularly the Exclusionary 
Rule incorporated against the states by Mapp v. Ohio.13  Both 
stimuli served to enlarge the class of cases in which acquittal 
indicated something other than innocence.  Congress’s response 
was 18 U.S.C. § 3577, a statute that codified Williams’s result 
without the benefit of its reasoning.  Section 3577 differed 
markedly from Williams in: (1) emphasizing the absence of limits 
on the admission of prior acquitted conduct at sentencing and 
(2) providing a safe harbor to lower courts against reversal for 
improper prior acquittal sentencing. 
Part III contrasts the differing effects of Williams and of 
§ 3577 on the decisions of lower courts by examining a naturally 
occurring controlled experiment.  In the wake of § 3577’s passage, 
several courts of appeals reviewed decisions that had relied on 
prior acquitted conduct as a sentencing factor.  While some of 
those cases viewed the issue as governed by § 3577, others 
deemed Williams to be the controlling authority.  Comparison of 
the two lines of cases is revealing:  Those cases governed by 
§ 3577 betray a mechanized application of a text whose import 
and underlying justifications they fail to grasp, while those cases 
following Williams demonstrate a thoughtful consideration of the 
logic underlying prior acquittal sentencing, combined with an 
attentive scrutiny of the underlying factual evidence for indicia of 
reliability.  
Part IV examines the next major development in prior 
acquittal sentencing: the promulgation of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines (“the Guidelines”).  By incorporating § 3557 and 
instructing judges to consider all relevant conduct, the 
Guidelines effectively transformed § 3557 from a statute 
permitting prior acquittal sentencing to one mandating prior 
acquittal sentencing.  The effect was immediate.  In the wake of 
the Guidelines’ promulgation, a sharp uptick in the number of 
prior acquittal sentencings rendered under § 3557 occurred.  
These cases partook of the mechanization widely identified as 
inherent to Guidelines-based sentencing.  Post-Guidelines prior 
acquittal sentencing exhibited a strong tendency to decide cases 
through statutory interpretation of § 3557, rather than by 
considering the goals of sentencing and the underlying 
justifications of prior acquittal sentencing. 
 
13 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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Part V turns to the Watts decision with which this Article 
opened.  By Part V, the decision will seem a foregone conclusion, 
dictated by the triple-threat of Williams, § 3577, and the 
Guidelines.  The formulation of the Watts holding is significant in 
two respects, however.  First, its framing is more akin to 
Williams’s holding than it is to § 3577.  By its negative phrasing 
as the denial of any per se prohibition on the use of prior 
acquitted conduct at sentencing, Watts both leaves room for as-
applied challenges to particular uses of prior acquitted conduct 
and encourages sentencing judges to exercise discretion when 
deciding whether or not to engage in prior acquittal sentencing.  
Second, Watts’s holding specifically incorporates a standard for 
evidentiary reliability into its test for the admissibility of prior 
acquitted conduct at sentencing. 
Part VI addresses the future of prior acquittal sentencing 
after Booker.  In a post-Guidelines regime, judges have great 
discretion as a matter of law with respect to prior acquittal 
sentencing.  Part VI argues that they should reassert that 
discretion, at the very least scrutinizing prior acquitted conduct 
for indicia of reliability prior to admission.  Moreover, it argues 
that certain policy considerations weigh against the use of prior 
acquitted conduct as a sentencing factor even in the narrow class 
of cases where that use is justified by the logic of sentencing.  
Even in that class of cases, Part VI posits, judges should weigh 
those policy consideration against the good of accuracy in 
sentencing when exercising their discretion. 
I. WILLIAMS V. NEW YORK: EXTRA-TRIAL EVIDENCE AT 
SENTENCING 
The use of prior unconvicted conduct as a sentencing factor 
first came before the Supreme Court in the 1949 case, Williams 
v. New York.  In that case, the Court held that the Due Process 
Clause did not prohibit a sentencing judge from relying on a  
presentence report containing information about the defendant’s 
prior uncharged crimes that would not have been admissible at 
trial.14   
As the federal government’s first foray into the issue of using 
extra-trial evidence at sentencing, Williams serves as the point of 
departure for analysis of prior acquittal sentencing.  Williams’s 
 
14 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250–51 (1949). 
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approach to the logically prior question of uncharged conduct in 
sentencing is consistent with the later Watts Court’s reasoning 
with respect to prior acquittal sentencing.  Nonetheless, the two 
decisions also demonstrate important differences.  One of this 
Articles’s central tasks is to trace and explain prior acquittal 
sentencing’s journey from Williams to Watts, before evaluating 
that transformation normatively and suggesting a course of 
action for the future.  
A. Background and Holding 
Nearly half a century before the Watts decision, Samuel Titto 
Williams was convicted of first-degree murder for a killing that 
occurred during a robbery.  The jury, which was not presented, 
per the Rules of Evidence,15 with evidence of Williams’s alleged 
prior misdeeds, recommended life imprisonment.16  Five weeks 
later, after a statutory pre-sentence investigation report had 
been filed with the judge, a sentencing hearing was held.  The 
presentence report included “accusations, based on hearsay 
unsworn statements of various persons with whom appellant was 
not confronted and as to whom he was afforded no opportunity 
for cross examination or rebuttal, that appellant had been guilty 
of other crimes.”17  These allegations reflected alleged conduct 
with which Williams had never been charged; as such, they were 
untried in any court of law.   
The defendant protested his innocence, but the sentencing 
judge imposed the death penalty on him.18  In a departure from 
typical practice, the sentencing judge chronicled his reasons for 
the upward departure from the jury’s sentence in great detail.  
From the presentence report, the judge had apparently “learned” 
that the defendant had committed nearly thirty earlier 
burglaries, none of which had resulted in convictions, but to 
many of which he had confessed or been identified as the 
perpetrator.19  The report also contained certain first-hand 
accounts, including one by a seven year-old girl alleging that she 
 
15 FED. R. EVID. 404 (excluding character evidence of other crimes, wrongs, acts, 
or habits unless subject to various exceptions). 
16 Williams, 337 U.S. at 242. 
17 Brief for Appellant-Defendant at 4, Williams, 337 U.S. 241 (No. 671). 
18 Williams, 337 U.S. at 244. 
19 Id. 
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was sexually assaulted by the defendant,20 leading the sentencing 
judge to conclude that Williams “possessed a ‘morbid sexuality’ ” 
and to “classif[y] him as a ‘menace to society.’ ”21 
B. Underlying Rationales: Trial and Sentencing Distinguished 
An examination of the Williams decision reveals that it 
rests—at times implicitly—on two related rationales: (1) the 
differing epistemological goals of trials and sentencing and 
(2) the relationship between the goals of trials and the 
evidentiary restrictions imposed thereon.  It is argued below that 
these two rationales plausibly lay the groundwork to justify prior 
acquittal sentencing—but only in the narrow set of cases where 
defendants’ acquittals result from the evidentiary restraints 
imposed on trials rather than their actual innocence.  Before 
addressing prior acquittal sentencing, however, these two 
rationales and their interrelation must be considered. 
The evidentiary gap between trial and sentencing occurs 
precisely because the goals of trials differ from those of 
sentencing hearings.  That is, trials aim not to convict the guilty 
and acquit the innocent, but rather only to achieve the more 
modest goal of convicting those defendants whose guilt with 
respect to a given crime has been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt:  “Rules of evidence have been fashioned for criminal trials 
which narrowly confine the trial contest to evidence that is 
strictly relevant to the particular offense charged.”22  Sentencing, 
on the other hand, has the more ambitious aim of 
“individualizing punishment[ ]”23 to the individual character of a 
given offender.  To encompass sentencing’s broad goals, a 
sentencing judge must, above all, strive to see a defendant as he 
really is24:  “Highly relevant—if not essential—to [the sentencing 
 
20 Brief for Appellant-Defendant at 8–9, Williams, 337 U.S. 241 (No. 671). 
21 Williams, 337 U.S. at 244. 
22 Id. at 246–47; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 372 (1970) (“It is 
critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof 
that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. . . . [W]e do 
not view the social disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the 
disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty.”). 
23 Williams, 337 U.S. at 249. 
24 This goal of “seeing the defendant as he really is” is embodied in the 
Guidelines’ adoption of elements of “real-offense sentencing” as opposed to “charge-
offense sentencing.” For a critical overview, see David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic, and 
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judge’s] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of 
the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life 
and characteristics.”25  This aim of seeing the defendant as he 
truly is is best served, in the Court’s view, by allowing as much 
information as possible to be available to the sentencing judge: 
“[M]odern concepts individualizing punishment have made it all 
the more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an 
opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of 
rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly 
applicable to the trial.”26  
Here, then, is the purest account of the Court’s decision to 
allow extra-trial evidence at sentencing:  To determine whether 
or not a presumptively innocent man should face the stigma of 
criminal conviction, trials employ rules of evidence that allocate 
most of the risk of error onto the prosecution—often forgoing 
potentially probative evidence in order to avoid the risk bias to 
the defendant.27  Many of the rules of evidence applicable at trial, 
from the heightened burden of criminal proof at trials to the 
exclusion of hearsay and character evidence, can be justified by 
this rationale.28  Once that high threshold has been cleared and a 
defendant has been convicted, however, the state is no longer 
willing to forgo potentially probative evidence before it.  The 
allocation of error changes as the state’s role shifts from protector 
of the innocent to seeker of truth.  
Once a defendant is convicted, the state has a weighty 
responsibility both to the defendant and to the rest of society to 
evaluate the defendant as accurately as it can in order to impose 
upon him the sentence most likely to rehabilitate him, to deter 
others from crime, to incapacitate him if he is a danger to himself 
or others, and to do justice in making up for his crime.29  Each of 
 
Injustice: Real-Offense Sentence and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. 
REV. 403 (1993). 
25 Williams, 337 U.S. at 247. 
26 Id. 
27 ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 1 (2005) (The Rules of Evidence 
were “designed to prevent tribunals concerned solely with the issue of guilt of a 
particular offense from being influenced to convict for that offense by evidence that 
the defendant had habitually engaged in other misconduct.”); accord Williams, 337 
U.S. at 247. 
28 See STEIN, supra note 27, at 183–97.  
29 See Williams, 337 U.S. at 248 n.10 (sentencing judge must have full 
information in order to sentence so as to bring about rehabilitation of the defendant); 
accord U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1 (2010) (detailing the goals of 
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these tasks requires that the sentencing judge form as accurate a 
picture as possible of the character of the defendant being 
sentenced.  To do these tasks well, the Williams Court reasons, 
the sentencing judge’s hands cannot be tied by the full panoply of 
restrictions found in the Rules of Evidence.  Rather it is 
“necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity 
to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of rigid 
adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to 
the trial.”30  Indeed, the Court finds knowledge of prior offenses, 
charged or uncharged, to be particularly important to 
understanding the defendant’s character due to the “sharp 
distinction[ ] . . . between first and repeated offenders.”31  
Moreover, although Williams dealt with uncharged conduct 
rather than prior acquitted conduct, the foregoing analysis 
carries within it all the elements necessary to justify the 
admission of prior acquitted conduct at sentencing.  Williams’s 
focus on the need for the sentencing judge to truly understand 
the defendant’s character,32 coupled with its special emphasis on 
the importance of recidivism as a telling feature of a defendant’s 
psyche,33 leads logically to the conclusion that there are cases in 
which prior acquitted conduct would be relevant to sentencing.  
That is, acquittal in a criminal case does not always track 
innocence.  Rather, as a doctrinal matter, acquittal merely 
indicates that the prosecution failed to prove at least one element 
of the crime to the satisfaction of a factfinder beyond a 
reasonable doubt.34  In some cases, that failure will be 
attributable to the innocence of the defendant.  In others, 
however, a guilty defendant could be acquitted based on 
prosecutorial misstep, a sympathetic jury, or the restrictions 
imposed by the rules of evidence.  In each of these latter cases, a 
judge could—and, under Williams’s logic, perhaps should—
 
sentencing under the Guidelines, including deterrence, retribution, and 
incapacitation). While rehabilitation is not one of the purposes of sentencing under 
the Guidelines, it was a strong consideration in pre-Guidelines sentencing and, by 
all evidence, continued to influence judicial decisionmaking both during the 
Guidelines period and afterwards. 
30 Williams, 337 U.S. at 247. 
31 Id. at 248. 
32 See id. at 247. 
33 See id. at 248. 
34 See, e.g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361 
(1984). 
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consider prior conduct of which the defendant was acquitted.  A  
 
recidivist acquitted after prosecution by an inept prosecutor has 
character no different from that of the recidivist convicted by a 
skilled prosecutor. 
C. One Potential Model of Extra-Trial Sentencing 
Two additional aspects of Williams’s holding, which differ 
from later models of extra-trial sentencing, are worthy of note.  
First, in arriving at its decision, the Williams Court employed a 
“totality of the circumstances” decisionmaking process that 
balanced a multiplicity of factors.  The Court’s decision was 
predicated not only on the different theoretical purposes of 
sentencing and trial and their concomitant abstract evidentiary 
needs, but also on a variety of concrete indicia of reliability 
particular to the case at hand.  The Court noted, for example, 
that Williams had been represented by counsel at his sentencing 
hearing and that the highest court of the state had reviewed the 
court’s factual findings—among them, the fact that the defendant 
had confessed to many of the relevant prior uncharged crimes 
and that he had not challenged their veracity at trial35—for an 
abuse of discretion.36  The Court allowed the introduction of prior 
uncharged conduct, then, not simply because sentencing is 
properly a truth-seeking exercise, but also because the admitted 
evidence was itself reliable.  Accordingly, the need to apply those 
laws of evidence designed to ensure reliability was mitigated.37 
Second, Williams’s holding is framed negatively, leaving 
room for as-applied challenges.  Rather than holding that extra-
trial evidence is per se admissible, the Williams Court proffered a 
much more limited holding:  “We cannot say that the due-process 
clause renders a sentence void merely because a judge gets 
additional out-of-court information to assist him in the exercise 
of this awesome power of imposing the death sentence.”38  By 
 
35 See Williams, 337 U.S. at 244. 
36 Id. at 252. 
37 Some evidentiary rules, such as the hearsay rule, are ordered primarily 
toward ensuring the reliability of evidence presented at trial. See Charles L. Barzun, 
Rules of Weight, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1957, 1985 (2008) (“Of course, the purpose 
of some common admissibility rules, such as the hearsay rule or the original 
documents rule, is also to account for the reliability of evidence.”). 
38 Williams, 337 U.S. at 252. 
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holding only that the Due Process Clause does not per se prohibit 
the use of out-of-court information at sentencing, the Williams 
Court ensured that any subsequent court seeking to rely on 
extra-trial evidence would be compelled to justify its actions.  
One obvious way to do so would be to engage in individualized 
factual considerations like those the Williams Court included in 
its multi-factor evaluation of Samuel Titto Williams’s situation.  
Moreover, Williams’s narrow holding reflected a minimalism that 
left ample room for later courts to interpret and add to its “test,” 
should they so choose.  As discussed below, some courts of 
appeals would choose to accept that offer. 
Notwithstanding any logical groundwork that may have 
been laid by the Williams Court, in the two decades following 
Williams no court is recorded as sentencing any offender based 
even partly based on conduct for which he had already been 
acquitted.39  That is not to say, of course, that no court sentenced 
any offender using his prior acquitted conduct as a sentencing 
factor based on Williams during this time.  Sentencing appeals 
prior to the advent of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were 
fewer than they are today; because judges were not required to 
make public their reasoning for sentencing, objections could only 
be made to their methods in the few cases in which they did 
happen to idiosyncratically reveal their methods.40  Nonetheless, 
an examination of law review and trade publications of the time 
reveals that, if such was occurring, the trend was so diffuse as to 
escape the notice of both the scholarly community and the ever-
vigilant defense bar. 
 
39 See infra Appendix. The one potential exception is United States v. Castaldi, 
338 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1964), vacated, 384 U.S. 886 (1966). However, this case has a 
very unusual fact pattern wherein the defendant was actually sentenced for 
contempt for refusing to testify about a prior acquittal in front of a grand jury. 
Castaldi, 338 F.2d at 884. Since the case involves another offense—contempt—it 
does not fit the mold for a paradigmatic prior acquittal as sentencing factor case. 
40 Indeed, prior to the Guidelines, “[g]enerally, federal sentences [were] not 
reviewable.” United States v. Powell, 487 F.2d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 1973); see also Gore 
v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (“First the English and then the Scottish 
Courts of Criminal Appeal were given power to revise sentences, the power to 
increase as well as the power to reduce them. This Court has no such power.”). In 
the Williams case, the judge idiosyncratically revealed his methods allowed. See 
Brief for Appellant-Defendant at 5, Williams, 337 U.S. 241 (No. 671). 
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II. A BLUNT INSTRUMENT: § 3577 AND CONGRESSIONALLY-
MANDATED TRUTH-SEEKING 
 The eventual trend toward prior acquittal sentencing found 
its catalyst in the 1970 passage of 18 U.S.C. § 3577.  Later 
incorporated into the Guidelines by the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984 as 18 U.S.C. § 3661,41 the statute would be the point of 
departure and a decisive factor in the Watts decision.42  The text 
of 18 U.S.C. § 3661 provides in full:  “No limitation shall be 
placed on the information concerning the background, character, 
and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of 
the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of 
imposing an appropriate sentence.”43  
Although the statute served as the backbone for both the 
Watts Court’s analysis and many of the lower court opinions upon 
whose consensus the Watts opinion depended,44 discussion of its 
origins in the sentencing literature is minimal.45  Analysis 
reveals, however, that the passage of § 3661 was a turning point 
in the history of prior acquitted sentencing.  Moreover, § 3557’s 
passage was motivated by considerations already familiar to us 
from their role in the Williams decision: sentencing’s goal of 
seeing a defendant as he really is and the inadequacy of the rules 
of evidence in achieving that goal.  Indeed, Congress explicitly 
chose to intervene in the sentencing process via § 3661 because of 
its concern that the gap between acquittal and innocence was 
widening as a result of both the manipulations of organized crime 
and the evidentiary reforms of the Warren Court.  As discussed 
 
41 See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 211, 98 Stat. 1976, 
1987. For purposes of this Article, “§ 3577” and “§ 3661” will be used 
interchangeably, unless used in reference to a particular time period. 
42 United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 151 (1997) (per curiam) (“We begin our 
analysis with 18 U.S.C. § 3661 . . . .”). 
43 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006). 
44 See, e.g., United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
45 Indeed, the only analysis of the origins of 18 U.S.C. § 3661 found in the 
literature on Watts and on the use of prior convictions in sentencing comes in the 
form of fleeting analysis of the provision’s inclusion in the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines in 1984.  See, e.g., Joshua M. Weber, Note, United States v. Brady: 
Should Sentencing Courts Reconsider Disputed Acquitted Conduct for Enhancement 
Purposes Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?, 46 ARK. L. REV. 467, 471 (1993) 
(“In fact, pre-guidelines statutory language in 18 U.S.C. § 3577 was transferred, 
without change, into 18 U.S.C. § 3661 of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, thus 
evincing strong legislative intent that the information a judge should consider is 
extensive, provided it is relevant to the offender’s characteristics or offense 
circumstances.”). 
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below, Congress’s response to that widening gap was far more 
categorical than was the Williams Court’s.  Framed affirmatively 
and devoid of any suggestion of multi-factor balancing,  
 
Congress’s response to what it saw as the evidentiary challenges 
of La Cosa Nostra and the Warren Court would have significant 
ramifications for prior acquittal sentencing. 
A. Combating Manipulation of Evidentiary Rules by Organized 
Crime 
What is now known as 18 U.S.C. § 3661 was first passed on 
October 15, 1970 as 18 U.S.C. § 3577, Title X of the Organized 
Crime Control Act of 1970.46  The Organized Crime Control Act of 
1970 is most famous for its Title IX, which addresses “Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations.”47  The RICO statute has 
been tremendously influential in both law enforcement and 
popular culture.48  While the other titles in the statute are less 
high-profile, consideration of the statute as a whole and of its 
legislative history can shed light on the pressures that came to 
bear in moving the country from agonizing over the 
jurisprudence of Williams to easily deciding the Watts case. Most 
notably, the bill’s text, history, and structure reveal a desire to 
curb manipulation of evidentiary rules by sophisticated 
criminals. 
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was passed in 
response to congressional findings that “organized crime in the 
United States . . . annually drains billions of dollars from 
America’s economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of 
force, fraud, and corruption.”49  More saliently for this Article’s 
purposes, the Act was passed to address the additional 
congressional finding that prosecution of organized crime was 
being hindered by evidentiary burdens:  
[O]rganized crime continues to grow because of defects in  
the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the 
development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to 
bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the 
 
46 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922. 
47 § 901, 84 Stat. at 941.  
48 See, e.g., The Sopranos: 46 Long (HBO television broadcast Jan. 17, 1999) 
(referencing the “Golden Age” as the days before RICO). 
49 84 Stat. at 922. 
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unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and 
because the sanctions and remedies available to the 
Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.50   
This preamble does not appear to have been mere cheap talk.  
Rather, it was a bone of contention that attracted criticism from 
some of the Act’s critics.  Representative Conyers, for example, 
the congressman from Michigan who spoke against the bill 
during the House debates on its passage, targeted this 
preamble’s focus on the courts in his critiques thereof:  
[T]he statement of the findings and purpose embody a very 
disturbing notion to me . . . [quotes the above two passages] . . . .   
. . . .  
Now I think with a bit of reflection the Members will begin to 
perceive that this whole bill is based on the idea that somehow 
the courts have been preventing the effective prosecution of 
criminal activities in this country and that by some means or 
other there are defects in the evidence-gathering processes 
which this bill has sought to remedy. 
   
I, as one Member, want to make clear a very distinct 
disagreement with the primary motivation that is stated in the 
purpose behind this bill.  The courts have not been the major 
culprits in the fight against crime.  The judges have not been 
the ones who have been making it difficult for prosecuting 
attorneys to bring criminals in the organized syndicates to trial.   
 
The rules of evidence, and the criminal law, have not been 
derelict or weak or soft or in any way supportive of the criminal 
elements once we get them into court.  I think, in a nutshell, 
nothing will clearly reveal the incorrect theory on which this 
entire bill is based than that section that I have cited to you in 
the statements of finding and purpose.51 
No one rose to rebut Representative Conyers’s interpretation of 
the Act or its preamble.  Rather, the only response he received 
was a subdued and acquiescing, “I thank the gentleman for his 
very important contribution,” from Representative Bingham of 
New York, a fellow opponent of the Act.52 
 Mr. Conyers seems to have been correct to worry that the Act 
as a whole was in part an assault on, and a reformation of, the 
 
50 Id. at 923. 
51 116 CONG. REC. 35,214 (1970) (statement of Rep. Conyers). 
52 Id. (statement of Rep. Bingham). 
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specifically linked the former weakness in the “evidence-
gathering process” with “enhanced sanctions and new 
remedies”53:  
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized 
crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in 
the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal 
prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new 
remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in 
organized crime.54   
Even apart from § 3577, many aspects of the Organized Crime 
Control Act of 1970 are addressed to evidentiary issues.  As 
discussed below, both the statute’s text and its legislative history 
reflect Congress’s frustration that organized crime bosses, when 
prosecuted, frequently managed to escape conviction through 
their corruption and manipulation of the criminal justice system, 
and, in particular, of the evidentiary protections that system 
affords defendants.  
1. The Provisions of the Organized Crime Act of 1970 
The first seven titles of the Organized Crime Act of 1970 
have a particularly evidentiary focus and are seemingly geared 
towards the prevention of mob manipulation of the evidentiary 
protections of trial or of evidentiary limitations hindering the 
prosecution of mob bosses.55  Title I of the Act, for example, 
 
53 84 Stat. at 923. 
54 Id. 
55 As Representative Rodino explained:  
Law enforcement officials know who the racket leaders are, and they know 
the organizational hierarchy of the different “families” of organized crime. 
This information, in fact, is freely available to the public: the most recent 
organization charts of the underworld are published in the Senate hearings 
on S. 30, pages 124 to 128. However, under current laws and procedures, 
the men at the top are virtually untouchable because they seldom commit 
crimes for which they can successfully be prosecuted. Further, they are 
buffered from the law by lawyers of subordinates and flunkies to the point 
where the numbers runners and narcotics pushers frequently don’t know 
for whom they’re really working, and those who do know also know what 
happens to “informers.” The brutality recorded in “The Godfather” pales in 
comparison with some stories in the police files.  
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allowed for the calling of “Special Grand Juries” to be convened 
for eighteen-month periods “[i]n addition to such other grand 
juries as shall be called from time to time” in large cities when 
the Attorney General’s office decides that “a special grand jury is 
necessary because of criminal activity in the district.”56  It easily 
evoked the worry, substantiated by past experience, that 
organized crime families might be able to taint, threaten, or 
otherwise overwhelm the existing grand jury system.57  
Title II provided both a carrot and a stick to prosecutors 
seeking to encourage low-level mobsters to cooperate with federal 
prosecutions.  As a stick, it forced witnesses to testify before 
federal courts, grand juries, U.S. agencies, and Congress and 
removed any right they might have had to remain silent to avoid 
self-incrimination.  As a carrot, it immunized such witnesses 
from prosecution for their testimony.58  Armed with Title II, 
prosecutors could encourage low-level members of organized 
crime organizations to “flip,” testifying against their old bosses.  
In the process, prosecutors would not be haunted by the specter 
of low-level mobsters seeking to proect their bosses through 
extensive invocation of evidentiary privileges—as had been 
known to occur before the passage of Title II.59 
Title III allowed for contempt proceedings to be brought 
against “recalcitrant witnesses,”60 adding another stick to the 
bundle given to prosecutors by Title II to use against witnesses 
scared of mob repercussions for their testimony.  Along similar 
lines, Title IV provided extra fines for those who perjure 
themselves before federal courts and grand juries.61  In an effort  
 
The major purpose of the legislation under consideration today is to provide 
the criminal justice system with the necessary legal tools to get at 
organized crime. 
116 CONG. REC. 35,200 (1970) (statement of Rep. Rodino). 
56 § 101, 84 Stat. at 923. 
57 For an account of La Cosa Nostra’s attempted tampering with juries, see 
ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THE ENEMY WITHIN 62 (1960) (“When the case was retried in 
the spring of 1958, Mr. Hoffa was acquitted. During this trial an attempt was 
made—unsuccessfully—to influence one of the jurors.”). 
58 § 201, 84 Stat. at 927. 
59 See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 57, at 210 (“On the witness stand Raddock, on 
grounds of self-incrimination, would not tell us whether he knew the Gary Teamster 
leader, Sawochka, or whether he had tried to fix the case for Hutcheson or the other 
Carpenter officials. Sawochka also took the Fifth Amendment.”). 
60 § 301, 84 Stat. at 932. 
61 § 401, 84 Stat. at 932. 
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to protect those cooperating witnesses who did “flip,”62 Title V 
provided for protected facilities for housing government 
witnesses.63  
To preserve the testimony of witnesses imbued with 
temporary courage who might be subject to later mob pressure to 
change their recollection of a course of events, Title VI provided 
prosecutors with the ability to take depositions to preserve the 
testimony of witnesses.64  Title VII tackled the evidentiary 
question directly, limiting the use of the Exclusionary Rule and 
other evidentiary restrictions on “claim[s] by a party aggrieved 
that evidence is inadmissible because it is the primary product of 
an unlawful act or because it was obtained by the exploitation of 
an unlawful act”65 by placing stringent time and disclosure limits 
on when such a claim must be invoked.  Notably for this Article’s 
purposes, that provision is offered in direct response to “special 
findings” by Congress that “claims that evidence offered in 
proceedings was obtained by the exploitation of unlawful acts, 
and is therefore inadmissible in evidence” are often difficult to 
prove reliably, especially when there is a significant time lag 
between offense and trial.66  Thus, Congress sought to protect the 
government from spurious, but difficult to disprove, evidentiary 
allegations by La Cosa Nostra. 
Titles VIII through XI propose more substantive changes to 
the criminal law. These include strengthening the 
criminalization of illegal gambling, criminalizing the obstruction 
of law enforcement with respect to gambling, and establishing a 
commission to review national policy toward gambling (Title 
VIII),67 outlawing racketeering and setting in place procedures  
 
62 Government was, of course, already working to guard mafia informants. Joe 
Valachi, who testified before the Senate in 1963, for example, was “guarded night 
and day.” PETER MAAS, THE VALACHI PAPERS 55 (1968). The congressmen voting on 
the Organized Crime Control Bill of 1970 would have watched Valachi’s testimony 
nightly. Jay Mader, Dancer the Testament of Joseph Valachi, October–November 
1963 Chapter 320, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Apr. 11, 2001, at 27. 
63 §§ 501–02, 84 Stat. at 933. 
64 § 601, 84 Stat. at 934–35. 
65 § 702, 84 Stat. at 935. 
66 § 701, 84 Stat. at 935. 
67 §§ 801–04, 84 Stat. at 936–40. 
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for the prosecution thereof (Title IX),68 setting forth provisions for 
dangerous special offender sentencing (Title X),69 and adding 
additional regulation of explosives (Title XI).70  
As in the evidentiary section of the bill, each substantive 
provision in the Act is a near-direct response to some action 
taken by organized crime organizations in the months and years 
leading up to the passage of the Organized Crime Control Act of 
1970.  In the case of Title XI, for example, Congress’s floor 
discussion of the bill specifically connected the anti-explosive 
legislation with “the relatively recent but extremely grave 
problem of bombing incidents that have plagued the Nation”71 
and “the recent rash of bombings.”72  Title IX, too, was responsive 
to recent news—in his advocacy of the new racketeering 
regulation, Representative Rodino of New Jersey discussed 
recent events: 
Time [sic] magazine reported last year that profits from the 
rackets are—and I quote—“as big as United States Steel, the 
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., General Motors, 
Standard Oil of New Jersey, General Electric, Ford Motor Co., 
IBM, Chrysler, and RCA put together”—and most of this, of 
course is untaxed.73 
Thus, the provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act of 
1970 are the work of a Congress concerned with manipulation of 
the criminal justice system—and, more specifically, of the 
evidentiary safeguards surrounding defendants—by organized 
crime.  The Act represents an attempt to combat that 
manipulation by tightening evidentiary rules and arming 
prosecutors with additional tools to use against mob 
manipulation of the criminal justice system. 
2. Section 3577 in the Context of the Organized Crime Control 
 
68 § 901, 84 Stat. at 941–48. 
69 § 1001, 84 Stat. at 948–52. 
70 § 1101, 84 Stat. at 952–60. 
71 116 CONG. REC. 35,199 (1970) (statement of Rep. Rodino). 
72 Id. at 35,197 (statement of Rep. McCulloch). 
73 Id. at 35,199 (statement of Rep. Rodino) (quoting Nation: The Conglomerate of 
Crime, TIME, Aug. 22, 1969, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/ 
0,0171,898525,00.html). 
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Act of 1970 
Section 3577, the progenitor of 18 U.S.C. § 3661, is contained 
within Title X’s enactment of a “Dangerous Special Offender 
Sentencing” provision.74  Just as its general placement within the 
context of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was telling, 
so too is Section 3577’s location within Title X.  Section 3577 
serves Title X’s larger goal of tailoring sentences to the character 
of offenders, and, thus, of increasing the sentences of career 
offenders like mafia members. 
Title X’s overall purpose is to increase the sentences of 
certain organized crime heads deemed “dangerous special 
offender[s].”75  Representative Poff, one of the bill’s sponsors, 
strove to explain “the full context of each title of this bill,”76 
describing the background to Title X as the tendency of organized 
crime heads to escape the harsh sentencing necessary to protect 
society from their machinations:  
A staff study made by the Criminal Laws Subcommittee of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee a year ago, based upon FBI 
sentencing data, indicated that two-thirds of the La Cosa 
Nostra members included in the study and indicted by the 
Government since 1960 have maximum jail terms of 5 years or 
less.  Fewer than one-fourth received maximum jail terms for 
the offenses of which they were convicted.  Twelve percent did 
not go to jail at all.  The sentences for the majority of these 
organized criminals averaged only 40 to 50 percent of the 
maximums which were authorized by law.77 
Representative Poff coupled this reminder of the crime problem 
with the now-familiar plea for individualized sentencing:  
One difficulty with our sentencing law has been that, for a given 
crime, every offender has been exposed to the single maximum 
punishment authorized by the Congress.  The emphasis has 
been entirely upon the bare element of the crime which the 
defendant has committed, and not upon the kind of person the 
defendant is and the overall context in which the offense was 
committed—the circumstances of aggravation of the offense.  
Yet modern penologists believe that, in sentencing, the court 
should have broad leeway to consider the criminal and the 
 
74 § 1001, 84 Stat. at 948–51. 
75 Id. at 948. 
76 116 CONG. REC. 35,290 (statement of Rep. Poff). 
77 Id. at 35,296. 
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circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense, as 
well as the crime.78 
To combat these two problems, Representative Poff’s 1970 
Act proposed a new way of sentencing these “hard-core 
offenders”79: the four subsections of Title X.  The first subsection, 
§ 3575, established an elaborate—and constitutionally 
dubious80—system whereby prosecutors submitted notice to the 
court specifying that the defendant at hand qualified, in their 
view, as a “special offender” and detailing the reasons for that 
judgment.81  Then, upon conviction, a special presentence hearing 
would be held to determine whether the defendant did in fact 
qualify as a “dangerous special offender” based on his previous 
convictions, the fact that his felony was committed as a pattern 
of conduct, or his participation in a conspiracy.82  If he was found 
to fit those criteria, he could be sentenced “for an appropriate 
term not to exceed twenty-five years and not disproportionate in 
severity to the maximum term otherwise authorized by law for 
such felony.”83  Section 3576 established an equally elaborate 




80 Indeed, several of the Act’s opponents questioned the constitutionality of Title 
X. See, e.g., id. at 35,289 (statement of Rep. Podell) (“Title X of the bill seems to be a 
violation of the due process of law. It says: ‘If it appears by a preponderance of 
evidence that the defendant is a dangerous special offender, the court shall sentence 
the defendant to imprisonment for an appropriate term not to exceed 25 years.’ This 
is using a lesser standard of evidence, a civil standard, in a criminal proceeding.”); 
id. at 35,217 (statement of Rep. Eckhardt) (“I am most concerned, as I think some of 
my colleagues have observed, about what is called the dangerous special offender 
provisions of this bill and of the drug bill. It is found in this bill at title X. I would 
like to say a little about it because we have to know what it means to know precisely 
how it removes from the consideration of the jury a very serious element of what you 
may either call crime, as I prefer to call it, or you may call a status with respect to 
the nature of the dangerous special offender, as the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. 
Poff) prefers to call it.”); id. at 35,208 (statement of Rep. Ryan) (“Title X, concerned 
with the sentencing of so-called dangerous special offenders, is probably the grossest 
refutation of due process which this bill contains.”). 
81 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1001, 84 Stat. at 
948 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212(a)(1)–(2), 98 Stat. 1837, as amended by Sentencing 
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 2, 101 Stat. 1266). 
82 Id. (detailing the characteristics of a dangerous special offender).  
83 § 1001, 84 Stat. at 949. 
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fashion, whereby either the defendant or the government could 
appeal.84  
 
Tucked away after these two major and lengthy provisions 
were § 3577 and § 3578.  The latter established a repository for 
records of convictions and determination of the validity of such 
convictions for use, presumably, in dangerous special offender 
sentencing.85  Section 3577, the salient provision for this Article’s 
purposes, rejects any limitation on the information sentencing 
judges may consider.   
Section 3577’s placement within Title X is perfectly logical.  
Dangerous special offender sentencing, as proposed in § 3575, 
calls for the consideration of extra-trial information in the form 
of a presentence report—some of which it allowed to be withheld 
from the defendant’s consideration86—as well as the filing of a 
notice with the court ex parte by the prosecutor of the 
justifications for the prosecutor’s opinion that the defendant 
deserves a special sentence.87  Without a specific congressional 
authorization of these sources, any of them could have been 
subject to a due process challenge, notwithstanding the weak 
denial of a categorical due process bar on extra-trial information 
used at sentencing announced by the Williams Court. 
Thus, § 3577, one of the main bulwarks of the Watts decision, 
was passed in part to counteract the widening gap Congress 
feared between acquittal and innocence in the case of mobsters, 
sophisticated criminals well-able to manipulate the evidentiary 
rules established to guard the rights of less sophisticated 
defendants. 
 
84 Id. at 950–51. 
85 Id. at 951–52. The provisions of § 3578 do not specify that the records 
contained in the new repository must be used only for dangerous special offender 
sentencing. On the contrary, like § 3577, § 3578 does not mention dangerous special 
offender sentencing. Moreover, § 3578 specifies situations other than dangerous 
special offender sentencing in which the repository may be accessed, explicitly 
indicating that it has a use quite apart from dangerous special offender sentencing. 
Id. 
86 In potential tension with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(e)(2). 
87 See § 1001, 84 Stat. at 948–51. 
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B. The Gap Widens Further: The Warren Court’s Exclusionary 
Rule 
La Cosa Nostra’s was not the only evidentiary manipulation 
Congress wished to counteract through § 3577.  Indeed, nowhere 
did the text of § 3577 limit its reach to dangerous special offender 
sentencing.  Rather, § 3577 spoke in broad language.  “[N]o  
 
limitation” was to be placed on the information available to a 
court sentencing any person “convicted of an offense” in a “court 
of the United States.”88   
This sweeping language was a feature, rather than a bug, of 
the provision.  Representative Poff, the driving force behind 
§ 3577, billed it as of “importance not only to trials or organized 
crime figures, but of criminal defendants generally.”89  The Act’s 
opponents, too, seized on this fact as part of their criticism of 
Title X:  “Were mobsters the only victims of this assault on the 
Constitution, we would still object.  The fact that all defendants 
are the prey of its provisions makes the title even more 
indefensible.”90 
Indeed, Mr. Poff explicitly framed § 3577 as having a broader-
than-mob scope, describing it as a codification of the holding of 
Williams: “Title X preserves, in short, the traditional principle, 
approved by the Supreme Court in Williams v. New York, that 
sentencing proceedings are exempt from the rules of evidence 
constitutionally required at trial.  The Williams case . . . held 
that a sentencing court, unlike a trial court, can consider 
hearsay allegations not tested for reliability by the 
constitutional procedures of confrontation and cross-
examination.”91   
In extolling the virtue of the Williams case, and thus of § 3577, 
Poff stressed the need for full knowledge of a defendant in order 
to make an accurate sentencing judgment, quoting Justice 
Black’s majority opinion from Williams:  
 
88 See id. at 951.  
89 116 CONG. REC. 35,298 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff). 
90 Id. at 34,872 (statement of Rep. Ryan) (quoting the “[d]issenting [v]iews of 
Representative John Conyers, Jr., Representative Abner Mikva, Representative 
William F. Ryan, on the Organized Crime Control Act”). 
91 Id. at 35,194 (statement of Rep. Poff) (citations omitted) (citing Williams v. 
New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); see also Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 606 
(1967). 
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Highly relevant—if not essential—to [the sentencing judge’s] 
selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the 
fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and 
characteristics.  And modern concepts individualizing 




sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain 
pertinent information by a requirement of rigid adherence to 
restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial.92 
And yet, the language of § 3577 goes further than that of 
Williams.  The Williams Court framed its holding negatively, as 
a refusal to find that the Due Process Clause barred the use of 
extra-trial information at sentencing:  “The considerations we 
have set out admonish us against treating the due-process clause 
as a uniform command that courts throughout the Nation 
abandon their age-old practice of seeking information from out-
of-court sources to guide their judgment toward a more 
enlightened and just sentence.”93  Section 3577, on the other 
hand, was written both affirmatively and more categorically than 
the Williams holding:  “No limitation shall be placed on the 
information concerning the background, character, and conduct 
of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United 
States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an 
appropriate sentence.”94   
While the Williams formulation, embodying a certain judicial 
minimalism, easily left room for as-applied challenges that a 
particular use of extra-trial information at sentencing violated 
the Due Process Clause, the language of § 357795 effectively 
provided a safe harbor to any sentencing judge who decided to 
introduce extra-trial information as a sentencing factor.  How 
 
92 116 CONG. REC. 35,194 (statement of Rep. Poff) (quoting Williams, 337 U.S. at 
247). 
93 Williams, 337 U.S. at 250–51. 
94 Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1001, 84 Stat. 922, 951 (1970) (codified as 
18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1970), renumbered as 18 U.S.C. § 3561 (2006) by Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1987). 
95 The language of § 3577 may reflect that of a post-Williams case. See Gregg v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 489, 492 (1969) (“There are no formal limitations on 
[presentence reports’] contents, and they may rest on hearsay and contain 
information bearing no relation whatever to the crime with which the defendant is 
charged.”). 
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could such a decision be overturned when clear statutory 
authority prohibited the imposition of any limitation on the 
information available at sentencing?  Moreover, § 3577 bore no 
trace of the Williams Court’s careful focus on indicia of 
reliability.  Instead, the crystal-clear text proclaimed that no 
limitation should be imposed on the evidence admissible at 
sentencing.96 
Nor does this alteration seem to have been accidental.  The 
legislative history reveals Representative Poff to have beem a 
knowing architect of the change.  The congressman, himself an 
attorney who had originally been tapped by Nixon for Justice 
Rehnquist’s seat on the Supreme Court,97 explicitly addressed the 
rationale behind passing § 3577 in the course of the congressional 
debates.  On October 7, 1970, in the midst of congressional 
debate, Poff offered a summary and defense of the Act as a whole.  
He described the provision in now-familiar terms, linking it to 
Williams:  “Its purpose is to assure that a sentencing court will 
be able to obtain all pertinent information about the background 
and prior behavior of the defendant in all Federal criminal 
cases.”98   
Then, however, Poff’s analysis of the provision departed from 
the Williams analysis, targeting one particular evidentiary rule 
as part of the impetus for § 3577:  “The exclusionary rules 
developed for trial on the issue of guilt are not to be applied.”99  
Poff went on to cite two particular appellate cases as overruled 
 
96 § 1001, 84 Stat. at 951. 
97 Jeffrey Rosen, Renchburg’s the One!, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2001, at 15 
(“Initially, Nixon wanted to replace Justice Black with Representative Richard Poff, 
a moderate conservative from Virginia, whom Dean, then White House counsel, 
respected. But Poff took himself out of the running because he feared the ensuing 
publicity would force him to tell his son, then 12, that he had been adopted. (A few 
weeks after Poff withdrew, a muckraking Jack Anderson column forced him to tell 
the boy anyway.)”). 
98 116 CONG. REC. 35,298 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff). 
99 Id. (citation omitted) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3146(f) (1966), repealed by Bail 
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976, codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–56 (2006)). The statute referenced has since been repealed. Then 
§ 3146(f) allowed the use of all information without evidentiary restrictions in 
release hearings in non-capital cases prior to trial (bail hearings): “Information 
stated in, or offered in connection with, any order entered pursuant to this section 
need not conform to the rules pertaining to the admissibility of evidence in a court of 
law.” Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 2, 80 Stat. 214, 215 (1966) (codified as 
18 U.S.C. § 3146(f), repealed by Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 
1976, codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–56). 
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by the new § 3577.  “The result which was obtained in Verdugo v. 
United States, and the approach used in Armpriester v. United 
States, are no longer to obtain.”100 
 
Poff’s citation to Verdugo101 and Armpriester102 sheds 
significant light on his reasons for expanding Williams’s holding 
into the text of § 3577.  The portions of the two cases he cites are 
parallel in their reasoning.  Both hold that evidence obtained 
illegally and suppressed at trial under the Exclusionary Rule 
should also be excluded from sentencing.  
In Armpriester, for example, the Fourth Circuit rejected a 
motion filed by pro se defendant Howard Armpriester to vacate 
both the judgment against him and his sentence for altering and 
uttering post office money orders.103  Armpriester’s argument 
called for the Exclusionary Rule to be applied to sentencing.  He 
claimed that his confession had been obtained illegally due to 
unnecessary delay in taking him before the nearest available 
commissioner.104  As such, he argued, it was inadmissible at 
sentencing.105  Moreover, the confession’s introduction at trial 
had led him to give up any hope of an acquittal and to plead 
guilty.106  The Fourth Circuit rejected Armpriester’s claim on the 
factual grounds that the plea had almost certainly been based not 
on the illegal confession, but on “the availability of the swindled 
persons as witnesses and the certainty of overwhelming proof of 
guilt.”107  Nonetheless, in the section of the case cited by 
Representative Poff, the court indulged in extensive dicta on the 
hypothetical question of what its holding would have been had 
Armpriester’s factual claims held water:  “If there were any basis 
for a reasonable apprehension that the plea resulted from a 
confession illegally obtained, the defendant might be entitled to 
have the plea and the sentence stricken and a new trial 
 
100 116 CONG. REC. 35,298 (statement of Rep. Poff) (citations omitted) (citing 
Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 608–13 (9th Cir. 1968); Armpriester v. 
United States, 256 F.2d 294, 296–97 (4th Cir. 1958)). 
101 402 F.2d at 608–13. 
102 256 F.2d at 296–97. 
103 Id. at 295. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 296. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
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granted.”108  The Armpriester court then clarified that Williams’s 
holding did not extend far enough to allow the inclusion of 
evidence suppressed by the Exclusionary Rule at sentencing:  
A confession obtained in the circumstances alleged would 
certainly not be admissible in a trial upon a plea of not 
guilty. . . .  It is recognized that a court has wider latitude of 
inquiry in fixing the sentence than during a contest to decide an 
issue of guilt.  Nevertheless, we would not condone the use of 
evidence obtained in breach of the law, even for the limited 
purpose of determining the sentence.  The rationale of the 
Mallory case is that judicial proceedings shall stand or fall 
independently of evidence obtained in violation of Rule 5(a).109  
Thus, the Fourth Circuit made clear that, given the appropriate 
case or controversy, it would hold that the Exclusionary Rule 
applied to sentencing hearings, thereby hindering the truth-
seeking function of sentencing judges. 
Verdugo, a 1968 Ninth Circuit case, relied on and extended 
Armpriester, making the application of the Exclusionary Rule to 
sentencing the law of the Ninth Circuit.  In that case, defendant 
José Verdugo filed for resentencing on grounds that his 
presentence report contained information obtained from his home 
in the course of an illegal search and seizure.  The court excluded 
the evidence both from sentencing and trial:  “Verdugo’s second 
claim of error relating to the presentence report is that the 
inclusion in the report and consideration by the sentencing judge 
of information obtained from his home by unconstitutional search 
and seizure violated his rights under both the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments.”110  Relying on Armpriester, the Verdugo Court 
stated:  
Ours would seem like an a fortiori case, for the evidence 
considered in sentencing Verdugo was obtained in violation of a 
constitutional prohibition, not merely a rule of procedure.  
Moreover, the exclusionary rule with which we are concerned is 
a part of the constitutional right, not merely a rule of evidence 
adopted in the exercise of a supervisory power.111   
The Ninth Circuit then balanced the “strong public interest 
in the imposition of a proper sentence—one based upon an 
 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 296–97 (citations omitted). 
110 Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 609 (9th Cir. 1968). 
111 Id. at 610–11 (citations omitted) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)). 
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accurate evaluation of the particular offender and designed to aid 
in his personal rehabilitation”112 with the need to extend the 
reach of the Exclusionary Rule in order to “insur[e] observance of 
Fourth Amendment restraints by law enforcement officers.”113  It 
finally concluded that “where, as here, the use of illegally seized  
 
evidence at sentencing would provide a substantial incentive for 
unconstitutional searches and seizures, that evidence should be 
disregarded by the sentencing judge.”114 
The danger Representative Poff sought to avoid, then, is 
clear.  With the advent of new evidentiary rules like the Mallory 
Rule and the Exclusionary Rule, Poff was concerned that the 
holding of Williams would not be extended to cover these rules.  
Rather, Poff worried that the need to deter police abuse, a 
rationale underlying the Exclusionary Rule, would be allowed to 
limit sentencing judges in the information available to them at 
sentencing just as juries were limited.  The Exclusionary Rule 
introduced into trials a significant non-truth-seeking aim.  In so 
doing, it widened the gap between the aims of trial and the aims 
of sentencing—and, concomitantly, the gap between acquittal 
and innocence—even more.  Representative Poff, and ultimately 
Congress, reacted to the specter of an extension of the 
Exclusionary Rule’s non-truth-seeking principle into sentencing 
in part by passing § 3577.  This statute embodied a novel 
approach to the use of out-of-court evidence at sentencing—one 
whose categorical, affirmative language contrasted sharply with 
the previously regnant holding of the Williams Court. 
C. A Second Model of Prior Acquittal Sentencing 
A few brief remarks suffice to manifest the salient 
differences between the prior acquittal sentencing regime 
established by § 3577 and that of the Williams Court.  First, as 
discussed above, Williams’s holding merely indicated that prior 
acquittal sentencing could be constitutional, leaving open the 
possibility of as-applied challenges to certain instances of prior 
acquittal sentencing on due process grounds.  Section 3577, by 
contrast, affirmatively granted sentencing judges the power to 
 
112 Id. at 611. 
113 Id. at 611–12. 
114 Id. at 613. 
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employ prior acquitted conduct at sentencing.  Indeed, § 3577’s 
direction that limits not be placed on trial judges’ ability to use 
such conduct at sentencing rendered the statute a sort of safe 
harbor for sentencing judges.  Statutorily, they should never be 
reversed on appeal for their use of prior acquitted conduct at 
sentencing. 
 
Second, § 3577’s categorical language—“no limitation”—
made no mention of any requirement that prior acquitted 
conduct be verified as reliable.  Rather, § 3577 seemed to provide 
textually for judicial discretion of extremely broad scope, with no 
requirement that any external factors be considered by a judge in 
deciding whether or not to admit prior acquitted conduct as 
evidence at sentencing.  As illustrated below through their 
application to case law in the next Part, these differences 
between Williams’s holding and § 3577 would have a dramatic 
effect on any sentencing decisions governed by them. 
III. A NATURAL CONTROLLED EXPERIMENT: CASE LAW AFTER 
§ 3577 
Courts of appeals have relied on § 3577 to approve the use as 
sentencing factors of hearsay evidence,115 illegally obtained 
evidence,116 and alleged criminal activity for which the defendant 
had not been prosecuted.117  With these precursors, the 
consideration of prior acquitted conduct as a sentencing factor 
seemed all but inevitable.  And indeed, in sharp contrast with the 
two post-Williams decades, which lacked any sign of sentencing 
based on prior acquitted conduct, in the seventeen years between 
the passage of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970’s 
Section 3577 and the November 1, 1987, implementation of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, nine cases were appealed 
because of the use of prior acquitted conduct as a sentencing 
factor—a marked increase.118  
 
115 See United States v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681, 684 (3d Cir. 1976). 
116 See United States v. Lee, 540 F.2d 1205, 1211–12 (4th Cir. 1976). 
117 See Smith v. United States, 551 F.2d 1193, 1195–96 (10th Cir. 1977). 
118 See infra Appendix. The nine cases are: Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 477 
(9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Bernard, 757 F.2d 1439, 1444 (4th Cir. 1985); 
United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Plisek, 657 F.2d 920, 928 
(7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Morgan, 595 F.2d 1134, 1135 (9th Cir. 1979); 
United States v. Atkins, 480 F.2d 1223, 1224 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Sweig, 
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Perhaps because § 3577 failed to specifically address the use 
of prior acquitted conduct as a sentencing factor, however, a 
curious dichotomy is apparent in the post-§ 3577 case law.  That 
is, while a small subset of those cases based their rulings 
explicitly on the statutory authority of § 3577, a substantial 
majority ruled to admit prior acquitted conduct as a sentencing 
factor based purely on the precedential authority of Williams and 
of the then-recent cases admitting hearsay and other evidence 
excludable at trial in sentencing.   
The dichotomy between the two lines of cases forms a 
natural experiment of sorts.  The two lines of cases afford 
parallel snapshots of both prior acquittal sentencing as governed 
by § 3577 and of the same doctrine as it likely would have 
developed in the absence of § 3577.  A comparison of the two 
allows certain conclusions to be drawn about the effects of § 3577 
on prior acquittal sentencing. 
A. Reliance on § 3577: United States v. Plisek 
Of the nine prior acquittal sentencing cases decided between 
the 1970 passage of the Organized Crime Control Act and the 
1987 implementation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, only 
two seem to view § 3577 as determinative in their 
decisionmaking: the Seventh Circuit case United States v. 
Plisek,119 and the D.C. Circuit case United States v. Campbell.120  
Plisek, the first prior acquittal case decided based on § 3577, is 
the better model of the two for § 3577-reliant jurisprudence.121  
In Plisek, the Seventh Circuit was asked to decide whether a 
lower court’s use of a presentence report describing a defendant’s 
prior acquittal on a murder charge warranted resentencing.  The 
court turned first to § 3577:  
18 U.S.C § 3577 (1976) provides that “[n]o limitation shall be 
placed on the information concerning the background, 
character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which 
a court of the United States may receive and consider for the 
purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”  The broad scope 
 
454 F.2d 181, 182–83 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Avery, 473 F. Supp. 980, 982 
(S.D. Fla. 1979). 
119 657 F.2d 920. 
120 684 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982).  
121 Campbell’s reference to § 3577 is so fleeting that it effectively typifies a 
Williams and progeny based case more than a § 3577-based case. 
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granted by § 3577 has been held to authorize trial judges to rely 
on a wide range of information, including, for example, alleged 
criminal activity for which the defendant has not been 
prosecuted, illegally obtained evidence, and hearsay evidence.122  
Plisek’s Judge Pell saw no need even to nod in the direction of the 
discretion § 3577’s text – which merely forbade limitation on 
what the court “may receive and consider”—left him. Rather, he 
reasoned that the statute and its precedents made clear that he 
was not bound to exclude any evidence from his consideration—
unless that evidence fit one of two narrow due process exceptions.  
Moreover, the court relied on the legislative history of the 
provision, arguing that it was intended to be read broadly:  “A 
broad interpretation of this language finds support in the 
legislative history of § 3577, which makes it clear that the section 
was intended to ‘maximize sources of sentencing information, 
[and] to guard against the unnecessary formalization of 
sentencing procedures.’ ”123  Thus, in Plisek, questions of 
statutory interpretation—“Did § 3577’s text cover the case at 
hand?” “Was it intended to be read broadly?”—all but replaced 
the Williams Court’s focus on out-of-court evidence’s indicia of 
reliability.  
More troublingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial 
court’s admission of prior acquitted conduct as a sentencing 
factor precisely because the sentencing judge explicitly denied 
doubting that the defendant’s prior acquittal indicated innocence.  
In arguing that the Plisek trial judge had not placed undue 
emphasis on the acquitted conduct, the Seventh Circuit’s Judge 
Pell noted approvingly: 
Furthermore, additional comments of the court make it clear 
that he did not impose or enhance the sentence on the basis of 
his evaluation of the merits of the prior acquittal.  For example 
he remarked, “I, of course, can’t say that merely being indicted 
for a crime is a reason for putting someone in jail for some other 
crime,” and later, “I can’t try that (the murder) case.  He was 
found not guilty.  I really can’t go into the merits of it.”124  
An examination of the trial transcript confirms Judge Pell’s 
account.  The trial judge repeatedly denied any doubt as to the 
defendant’s innocence of the murder of which he had previously 
 
122 Plisek, 657 F.2d at 925 (citations omitted). 
123 Id. at 927 (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 90 (1969)). 
124 Id. at 927–28. 
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been acquitted.  Nonetheless, in an example of truly twisted 
reasoning, he decided to take the conduct into account anyway 
because, “[e]ven though [defense counsel was] able to successfully 
defend him in the [prior] murder charge, the fact that a person 
even gets into the situation, I think, is some evidence that he has 
some instability if not some proclivity to commit crimes.”125 
The real harm of Williams’s replacement by § 3577’s becomes 
visible.  Unlike Williams’s minimalist holding, which required 
judges to reason through the logic underlying prior acquittal 
sentencing, the mechanical implementation of the clear, 
categorical, affirmative language of § 3577 permitted sentencing 
judges to use prior acquitted conduct without ruminating on its 
justifications.  As a result, sentencing judges and those reviewing 
them on appeal were permitted to lose sight of the overarching 
theoretical justification for the institution of prior acquitted 
sentencing:  Some acquittals do not indicate innocence and, in 
those cases, sentencing judges will impose better, more accurate 
sentences if they know that the offender before them is a 
recidivist.  To divorce prior acquittal sentencing from that logic is 
to allow judges like the Plisek trial judge to sentence based on 
stereotypes about the “proclivities” of defendants who have 
previously been indicted.126  
 
125 Id. at 926 n.2. 
126 The trial transcript equally supports the alternate interpretation that the 
trial judge simply doubted that Plisek’s previous acquittal indicated exoneration. 
Consider the choice snippet: “Well, I am not thoroughly satisfied that that is 
complete exoneration [based on self-defense] when a person is stabbed repeatedly 
about the face and body during a fight. Maybe it is. I can’t try that case. He was 
found not guilty. I really can’t go into the merits of it.” Id. However, if such is the 
case, the havoc wreaked on the regime of prior acquitted sentencing by the 
mechanistic application of § 3577 to prior acquitted sentencing is even more severe 
than under the previous interpretation.  
 That is, under such an interpretation, the trial judge dissembled by (ineptly) 
hiding his doubt about the veracity of Plisek’s previous acquittal. In doing so, he 
thereby indicated his ignorance of the fact that (1) a prior acquittal not indicating 
exoneration is a permissible sentencing factor and (2) assigning “proclivities” to a 
class of innocent defendants is more likely to be reversible error than using 
unreliable prior acquittals as a sentencing factor. What’s worse, Pell, a judge on the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, shared that ignorance, “defending” the judge on 
grounds that he in no way used prior acquitted conduct as a sentencing factor, a case 
he made through nearly incomprehensible prose:  
[A]dditional comments of the court make it clear that he did not impose or 
enhance the sentence on the basis of his evaluation of the merits of the 
prior acquittal. . . . These remarks clarify the context in which the allegedly 
improper concerns were voiced: they reveal that the judge did no more than 
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B. In the Absence of § 3577: United States v. Sweig 
Of the nine prior acquittal cases decided between § 3577’s 
passage and the implementation of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, however, seven failed to invoke § 3577 entirely.  Of 
these, United States v. Sweig,127 the first prior acquittal case 
decided post-§ 3577—and, indeed, the first clear prior acquittal 
case decided post-Williams—is representative. 
In Sweig, the Second Circuit rejected a defendant’s 
contention that his sentence was invalid because the sentencing 
judge—ironically, Judge Frankel of the Southern District of New 
York—went out of his way to verbally express his reliance on 
prior acquitted conduct in making his sentencing determination.  
In rejecting the defendant’s claim, the Second Circuit held that 
Judge Frankel had not relied on acquitted conduct.128  If he had, 
however, the court maintained in dictum that that action would 
not have been impermissible—“[a] sentencing judge has very 
broad discretion in imposing any sentence within the statutory 
limits . . . .”129  Without the benefit of § 3577 as a bulwark, the 
court analyzed the nature of the acquittal in the Williams style, 
arguing that 
[a]cquittal does not have the effect of conclusively establishing 
the untruth of all the evidence introduced against the 
defendant.  For all that appears in the record of the present 
case, the jury may have believed all such evidence to be true, 
but have found that some essential element of the charge was 
not proved.130  
The court then went on to analogize the use of prior acquitted 
conduct to hearsay, a form of evidence admissible in sentencing, 
with respect to its reliability as evidence:  
 
examine and evaluate the presentence report and afford counsel a full 
opportunity to respond to any prejudicial inferences which might have been 
drawn from that section of the report. 
Id. at 927–28. It is unclear what Judge Pell took the sentencing judge to have done 
with the evidence of Plisek’s prior acquitted conduct or on what reasoning he 
affirmed the judge’s choice to do so. What is clear, however, is that mechanistically 
applying the text of § 3577, rather than prior acquittal sentencing’s underlying logic, 
potentially did a grave disservice to Karel Plisek, who was sentenced based on the 
“proclivity” to violence indicated by the fact that he had previously been acquitted of 
murder.  
127 454 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1972). 
128 Id. at 181–84. 
129 Id. at 183. 
130 Id. at 184. 
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In fact the kind of evidence here objected to may often be more 
reliable than the hearsay evidence to which the sentencing 




evidence involved here was given under oath and was subject to 
cross-examination and the judge had the opportunity for 
personal observation of the witnesses.131 
Once again, two points are worthy of note.  First, without the 
benefit of a text categorically allowing the admission of evidence, 
the court was willing—and, indeed, seems to have felt compelled 
to—analyze the facts of the case and its doctrines in terms of 
their underlying meanings and import.  Thus, the court in Sweig, 
unlike the court in Plisek, engaged in extended analysis of the 
true significance of acquittal, grounding its analysis in whether a 
potential disjunction between acquittal and innocence had 
occurred.  Moreover, to evaluate the degree to which acquittal 
and innocence were coterminous in the case at hand, the Sweig 
Court looked to independent indicia of reliability like the fact 
that evidence had been given under oath, that the evidence had 
been subject to cross-examination, and that the judge had the 
opportunity for observation of the witnesses. 
Second, although Sweig used the admissibility of hearsay at 
sentencing as a point of comparison—much as Plisek had done—
the two courts used the example of hearsay’s admissibility in 
different ways.  The Plisek Court used it as a benchmark in 
statutory interpretation:  If hearsay and illegally obtained 
evidence are included under “no limitation,” so too should prior 
acquittals be admitted.  The Sweig Court, on the other hand, 
used hearsay as a point of analogy:  If evidence based on hearsay, 
which is excluded because of concerns about its reliability, was 
allowed at sentencing, why should prior acquitted conduct—
which, in many cases, may be more reliable than hearsay, since 
the prior court will have done extensive fact-finding—not be 
used?  The Sweig Court’s analysis was deeper, more judicious, 
and, ironically, more concerned with the underlying truth at 
stake in the sentencing process than was the case following the 
 
131 Id. 
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path designed by Congress to emphasize the importance 
sentencing’s truth-seeking function.  
C. The Two Lines of Cases Compared 
The controlled experiment yields nicely contrasting results.  
The Plisek Court, seeing its decisionmaking as controlled by the 
categorical, affirmative language of § 3577, made its decision 
without any consideration of the logic underlying prior acquittal 
sentencing.  Indeed, the Plisek Court did not see fit even to 
mention either the evidentiary gap and difference in aims 
between trial and sentencing or the true meaning of acquittal.  
Moreover, the Plisek Court’s reasoning demonstrated that it had 
not internalized the justifications on which the Williams Court 
rested its holding.  Under § 3577, the mechanized application of a 
bright-line rule replaced the thoughtful consideration necessary 
for just prior acquittal sentencing. 
By contrast, the Sweig Court, seeing itself as governed by 
Williams’s example as much as by its sparse holding, proceeded 
more thoughtfully.  In making its ruling, the Sweig Court was 
forced by the lack of direct guidance from above to reconsider the 
major rationales in favor of prior acquittal sentencing—the 
different aims of trial and sentencing and the potential 
disconnect between acquittal and sentencing—as well as the 
presence or absence of outside indicia of the evidence’s reliability.  
The result was a ruling that walked a careful line, admitting 
prior acquitted conduct only in the class of circumstances in 
which it was actually justifiable. 
IV. PRIOR ACQUITTAL SENTENCING UNDER THE SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES 
While prior acquittal sentencing arose and increased 
markedly after the passage of § 3577, not until the promulgation 
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines did the number of appeals 
for prior acquittal sentencing explode.  In the ten years between 
the November 1, 1987, implementation of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines and the January 6, 1997, handing down of the Watts 
decision, ninety-four appeals from federal cases in which prior 
acquitted conduct was used as a sentencing factor would be filed, 
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with cases filed in every circuit.132  Because much has been 
written on the Guidelines and their tendency to render judges 
less judicious,133 and because the Guidelines’ impact on prior 
acquitted sentencing does not differ substantially from its impact  
 
on other areas of sentencing, the Guidelines’ substantial impact 
on prior acquittal sentencing will be addressed somewhat more 
briefly. 
A. The Guidelines 
In 1987, sentencing in the American criminal justice system 
changed dramatically with the implementation of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines.  Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984 as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1984.  The new Sentencing Guidelines had the purpose of 
“minimizing judge-created disparities” in sentencing,134 which 
were becoming a national scandal.135  Marvin Frankel’s 
solution136 to the problem of radical disparities in sentencing was 
to reduce judicial discretion.  He attributed the disparities to “the 
almost wholly unchecked and sweeping powers we give to judges 
in the fashioning of sentences,”137 recommending instead, 
“concrete agreement on concrete factors capable of being stated, 
discussed, and thought about in the style of a legal system for 
rational people rather than a lottery.”138  
The Sentencing Commission, led by now-Justice Breyer, took 
up the gauntlet thrown by Judge Frankel and drafted the 
Federal Guidelines, an elaborate formulaic system of rational 
sentencing.  The Guidelines proceeded based on a 
mathematical equation that begins with an offense level 
depending on its seriousness. . . .  That offense level is then 
reduced or increased depending on factors such as the 
 
132 See infra Appendix. As noted above, this trend occurred in part because the 
Guidelines required increased reporting by judges on the rationale underlying their 
sentencing, allowing for more frequent appeals. 
133 See generally KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING (1998). 
134 David Robinson, Jr., The Decline and Potential Collapse of Federal Guideline 
Sentencing, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 881, 884 (1996). 
135 See generally MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT 
ORDER (1973). 
136 See generally id. 
137 Id. at 5. 
138 Id. at 115. 
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defendant’s criminal history, level of cooperation, use of a 
deadly weapon and role in the offense. . . .  The sum of the 
factors leads to a box on a grid that suggests a sentencing range 
such as 0 to 6 months at the low end of 292 to 265 months at the 
high end.139  
Until the 2005 Booker decision,140 the Guidelines were mandatory 
on all federal courts.141 
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 adopted the former 
18 U.S.C. § 3577 as its own provision 18 U.S.C. § 3661.142  
Moreover, the provision was incorporated into the Guidelines 
themselves 
1B1.4. Information to be Used in Imposing Sentence (Selecting 
a Point Within the Guideline Range or Departing from the 
Guidelines):  In determining the sentence to impose within the 
guideline range, or whether a departure from the guidelines is 
warranted, the court may consider, without limitation, any 
information concerning the background, character and conduct 
of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 3661.143  
In so doing, the Commission effectively transformed § 3661 from 
a statute that might or might be applied in a given case—think, 
for example, of Sweig—into a part of the formula necessarily 
applied by judges in every sentencing.  The effect was heightened 
by Guideline section 1B1.3, which instructed courts to take 
account of “relevant conduct” in sentencing.144  Since prior 
acquitted conduct was “relevant” under the Guidelines, judges 
were suddenly not only allowed to take prior acquitted conduct 
into account, but were actually instructed to do so by Guidelines 
with the force of law.  The impact of the Guidelines on the use of 
prior acquitted conduct in sentencing was immediate and 
dramatic.  In the ten years prior to the implementation of the 
Guidelines, eight cases had dealt with the role of prior acquitted 
conduct in sentencing.  In the ten years following the Guidelines 
arrival, ninety-three were heard.145  While there was an eleven-
 
139 Deborah Pines, After Five Years, No One Loves the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 5, 1992, at 3. 
140 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
141 Id. at 245; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006). 
142 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212, 98 Stat. 1987. 
143 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.4 (2010). 
144 Id. § 1B1.3. 
145 See infra Appendix. 
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year lag between the 1970 passage of § 3577 and its first citation 
in a prior acquittal case, the implementation of Sentencing 
Guideline section 1B1.4 and its companion, section 1B1.3, into 
caselaw took a little over a year.146  
B. From Permission to Mandate: United States v. Mocciola 
In 1989, the First Circuit decided United States v. 
Mocciola,147 a prior-acquittal-as-sentencing-factor case in which a 
sentencing judge made use of a gun charge, of which the 
defendant had been acquitted, in sentencing him for a drug 
charge, of which he had been convicted.  Mocciola’s analysis of 
the role of prior acquittals in sentencing is standard for a post-
Guidelines case.  Rather than engaging in a lengthy inquiry into 
the purpose of sentencing and the underlying meaning of 
acquittal, the court instead engaged in statutory interpretation.  
After citing recent cases allowing the use of prior acquitted 
conduct in sentencing, the court quoted extensively from the 
Guidelines and from other cases interpreting Guideline section 
1B1.3.148  The legal inquiry being thus summarily concluded, the 
court inquired briefly into the reliability of the evidence 
considered by the sentencing judge before affirming the sentence:  
“[I]t is not clearly improbable that Mocciola’s pistol was 
connected with the drug possession offense.”149  
More saliently for the history of prior acquittal sentencing, 
however, was the gloss the cases Mocciola cited put on the 
Guidelines requirements vis-à-vis prior acquitted conduct.  
Mocciola relied on other courts’ interpretation of the Guidelines 
as 
requir[ing] courts to take account of “relevant conduct”—
conduct that, very roughly speaking, corresponds to those 
actions and circumstances that courts typically took into 
account when sentencing prior to the Guidelines’ enactment.  
Past practice, and authoritative case law, indicates that the 
Constitution does not, as a general matter, forbid such 
consideration.150  
 
146 See infra Appendix. 
147 891 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1989). 
148 Id. at 16. 
149 Id. at 17. 
150 Id. at 16. The court continues: 
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In the view of the Mocciola Court, then, the Guidelines had 
transformed prior acquittal sentencing.  Prior acquitted conduct 
was no longer merely permitted.  Sentencing judges now saw 
themselves as obligated to admit prior acquitted conduct into 
sentencing hearings with only minimal consideration of the 
reliability of the evidence supporting that conduct.151  
Within three years, every circuit but the Ninth would follow 
suit.152  By the time ten years had passed from the promulgation 
of the Guidelines, courts of appeals were able to dispense with 
appeals for use of prior acquitted conduct at sentencing in a few 
paragraphs by briefly gesturing at section 1B1.3 of the 
Guidelines and at a small fraction of the large body of relevant 
case law.153  
Prior acquittal sentencing had come a long way from its 
ancestry in Williams v. New York.  No longer a difficult issue 
requiring the consideration of the aims and limits of complex 
legal doctrines, the admission of prior acquitted conduct at 
sentencing was now de rigeur, a question to be decided 
automatically in the course of a few paragraphs with the help of 
a manual.  
The new regime was troubling in two respects.  First, the 
presumptive reliance on prior acquitted conduct mandated by the 
Guidelines differed dramatically from the use of such conduct to 
sentence the narrow class of defendants whose criminal history 
 
The Guidelines establish both the reason for the weapons enhancement 
and the circumstances in which it should be applied: “The enhancement for 
weapon possession reflects the increased danger of violence when drug 
traffickers possess weapons. The adjustment should be applied if the 
weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was 
connected with the offense. For example, an enhancement would not be 
applied if the defendant, arrested at his residence, had an unloaded 
hunting rifle in the closet.” 
Id. at 17 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(b)(1) cmt. n.3 
(2009)). 
151 Indeed, Mocciola gave somewhat more consideration to the purposes of 
sentencing and the reliability of the evidence underlying Mocciola’s acquitted 
conduct than would other courts under the Guidelines regime. See United States v. 
Slow Bear, 943 F.2d 836, 838 (8th Cir. 1991) (“Conduct which is the subject of an 
acquittal may be used to enhance a sentence under the Guidelines . . . . The district 
court’s enhancement of Slow Bear’s offense level for serious bodily injury was 
supported by the evidence and was not clearly erroneous.”). 
152 See supra text accompanying note 8. 
153 For a textbook example of this approach, see United States v. Clayton, No. 
96-4300, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 116 (4th Cir. Jan. 6, 1997). 
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included particularly unreliable acquittals, which latter use Part 
I suggested was justified.  The Guidelines’ mechanistic 
imposition of a sentence predicated on prior acquitted conduct is 
the antithesis of the case-by-case approach exemplified by 
Williams.  The Williams Court carefully inspected every facet of 
Williams’s circumstances in assessing whether or not to include 
his prior acquittals in the determination of his sentence.  Courts 
in cases like Mocciola, by contrast, simply applied the Guidelines 
rule that acquitted conduct is “relevant conduct” and, thus, 
applicable as a sentencing factor if it more plausibly than not 
took place. Those courts did not consider the totality of the 
defendant’s circumstances or the rationale underlying prior 
acquittal sentencing. 
Second, with the Guidelines came an unsurprising uptick in 
the number of sentencings relying on prior acquitted conduct,154 
even in comparison to the post-Watts era.  While it is plausible 
that this uptick was in some way related to an increased number 
of doubtful acquittals—indeed, Representative Poff predicted 
such an uptick as a result of the Warren Court’s evidentiary 
reforms—such factors can not wholly explain away the increase, 
given its magnitude.  More likely, in taking the Guidelines as 
their starting point in sentencing defendants, judges were led by 
section 1B1.4 to a presumption of the consideration of prior 
acquittals—a factor they might otherwise have viewed more 
skeptically.  Notwithstanding its permissive language, once 
§ 3661 was incorporated into the Guidelines and combined with 
the Guidelines’ requirement that relevant conduct be considered 
in sentencing, it was transformed into one of a host of factors 
through which the court marched mechanistically in every 
sentencing to which it was relevant. 
V. WATTS: THE SUPREME COURT IMPOSES A UNIFIED STANDARD 
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Watts is anything but mysterious.  As a matter of precedent, 
Williams had already held that out-of-court conduct could be a 
valid and useful sentencing factor.  Of course, the Williams Court 
merely demonstrated the virtues of the “totality of the 
circumstances” approach it embodied, rather than explicitly 
holding that such examination be undertaken by all later courts.  
 
154 See infra Appendix. 
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Nonetheless, the legislative imposition, by both Congress and the 
Sentencing Commission, of bright-line rules codifying Williams’s 
result without its method rendered Watts’s decision both easy 
and inevitable. 
Thirty-eight years after the trial of Samuel Titto Williams, 
the tale of prior acquitted sentencing achieved partial closure in 
the wake of the trial of Vernon Watts.  When police tracked 
Watts, a probationer, to his girlfriend’s home, they found cocaine 
base in her kitchen cabinets and two loaded guns with 
ammunition in a bedroom closet.155  At trial, Watts was acquitted 
on the firearm count.  Nonetheless, in sentencing him for the 
drug offense, the district court judge found by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Watts had possessed the two guns in 
connection with his drug offense.156  Two points were thus added 
to Watts’ base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines.157  
With the addition of the two base offense level points, Watts was 
sentenced to 262 months of incarceration and sixty months of 
supervised release.158  When Watts appealed on due process 
grounds, the Ninth Circuit vacated his sentence, holding that a 
sentencing judge does not have the power “ ‘under any standard 
of proof,’ [to] rely on facts of which the defendant was 
acquitted.”159  
The government petitioned for certiorari, and the Court 
“GVRed.”  That is, in its grant of certiorari, the Court also 
vacated the Ninth Circuit’s ruling and remanded to the lower 
court with directions to apply a different rule of law, all without 
the benefit of oral argument or merits briefing.160  The new rule, 
set forth by the Supreme Court as the law of the land, held that 
“a jury’s verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing 
court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, 
so long as that conduct has been proven by a preponderance of 
the evidence.”161  
In some sense, the Court’s decision was a foregone 
conclusion, given the occupation of the field by a congressional 
 
155 United States v. Watts, 67 F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1995). 
156 Id. 
157 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2009). 
158 Watts, 67 F.3d at 793. 
159 Id. at 797 (emphasis in original). 
160 United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (per curiam). 
161 Id. 
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statute, the Guidelines, and the Court’s own prior precedent.  
And, indeed, the Watts Court predicated its holding explicitly on 
18 U.S.C. § 3661’s162 provision that “[n]o limitation shall be 
placed on the information concerning the background, character, 
and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of 
the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of 
imposing an appropriate sentence.”163  This provision gained 
strength, the Court argued, from being incorporated into the 
Guidelines as section 1B1.4:  “In determining the sentence to 
impose within the guidelines range, or whether a departure from 
the guidelines is warranted, the court may consider, without 
limitation, any information concerning the background, character 
and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by 
law.”164  These two provisions, the Court continued, were part 
and parcel with a series of Supreme Court cases holding that 
sentencing courts were permitted to consider extra-trial facts 
during sentencing, most saliently the 1949 Supreme Court case 
Williams v. New York.165 
While the Watts decision should certainly be taken as a 
broad ratification of the use of prior acquitted conduct at 
sentencing, two aspects of the Watts holding give rise to a more 
nuanced evaluation of the Court’s handiwork.  First, the 
language of Watts’s holding stakes out a middle way between the 
restrained ambiguity of Williams and the categorical language of 
§ 3661, as incorporated into the Guidelines.  That is, the Watts 
Court’s holding that “a jury’s verdict of acquittal does not prevent 
the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the 
acquitted charge”166 is akin to Williams’s holding in its negative 
formulation; it merely establishes that the bare fact that conduct 
underlies an acquitted charge does not render it per se 
inadmissible in sentencing.  That holding is a far cry from 
§ 3661’s affirmation that “no limitation” may be put on the 
evidence that a court may consider.  Indeed, Watts’s language 
both leaves room for as-applied challenges and succeeds in 
placing more emphasis on the permissive nature of the holding.  
The provision begins not with the absence of limitation on the 
 
162 Id. at 151. 
163 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006). 
164 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.4 (2010). 
165 Watts, 519 U.S. at 165. 
166 Id. at 157. 
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admitted evidence but rather on the fact that the sentencing 
court is not prevented from using the evidence—but not required 
to do so either. 
Second, the Watts Court, for the first time, introduced an 
explicit reliability component into the test for admissibility of 
prior acquitted conduct.  The Court’s holding stated quite 
explicitly that prior acquitted conduct would be introduced only 
when it was “proved by a preponderance of the evidence.”167  That 
evidentiary standard contrasted sharply both with § 3661, whose 
“no limitation” standard acknowledged no explicit caveat for 
reliability, and with the holding of Williams, which analyzed 
indicia of reliability without enshrining the need to do so in its 
holding.168  Notable, too, is the fact that the reliability standard 
imposed by the Watts Court textually constitutes a floor, not a 
ceiling.  That is, no prior acquitted conduct may be admitted 
under Watts that is proved by less than a preponderance of the 
evidence.  No textual portion of Watts, however, prohibits a 
sentencing judge from subjecting prior acquitted conduct to a 
higher standard, up to and including the “proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt” standard used at trial. 
VI. PRIOR ACQUITTAL SENTENCING IN A POST-BOOKER WORLD 
For the first few years after the Watts case, its holding 
coexisted with the mandatory Guidelines.  However, since the 
Court’s holding in the 2005 Booker169 decision, the Guidelines are 
now merely advisory, leaving Watts as the main authority 
governing prior acquittal sentencing.170  More broadly, the Booker 
decision moves the dominant sentencing regime closer, as a 
doctrinal matter, to a pre-Guidelines regime of discretion in 
sentencing.  The question of how the prior acquittal sentencing 
landscape will change under this new regime is as yet 
 
167 Id. at 156. 
168 As a doctrinal matter, courts had imposed extra-textual due process 
limitations on § 3577, including an exclusion of felony convictions obtained 
unconstitutionally due to a deprivation of counsel, United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 
443 (1972), and an exclusion of misinformation submitted by the prosecution when 
an uncounseled defendant had no opportunity to prevent the court from being 
misled, Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740–41 (1948). 
169 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
170 Section 3661 is, of course, still in force. However, Watts, as the dominant 
interpretation thereof with respect to prior acquittal sentencing, is the law of the 
land in this area. 
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unanswered, however.  As in many other aspects of sentencing, it 
is not fully clear how the reintroduction of discretion into a 
system governed by mechanization for over a decade will be 
embraced by sentencing judges. 
 
 
This Part seeks to demonstrate that, as a doctrinal matter, 
judges have the discretion to limit their use of prior acquitted 
conduct in sentencing.  Further, it argues that to do so would be 
wise as a policy matter. 
A. Judicial Discretion 
Although judges have not always seen fit to employ it, the 
language in both Watts and § 3577 grant sentencing judges a 
large degree of discretion in deciding whether or not to consider 
prior acquitted conduct at sentencing.  Indeed, both texts are 
decidedly permissive, rather than mandatory.  Watts, for 
example, provides that “a jury’s verdict of acquittal does not 
prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying 
the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by 
a preponderance of the evidence.”171  Nothing in either text orders 
judges to consider prior acquitted conduct in sentencing or even 
hints at threatening them with reversal if they fail to do so.  
Indeed, even the less-permissive text of § 3661 provides merely 
that “[n]o limitation” be placed on the information “a court of the 
United States may receive and consider for the purpose of 
imposing an appropriate sentence.”172  Again, a careful reading of 
the statute indicates that it merely allows judges to consider 
prior acquitted conduct in sentencing, without mandating that 
they do so. 
Nor did the Guidelines change the text of § 3661 when 
incorporating it into section 1B1.4 of the Guidelines; the 
provisions continued in its original permissive formulation.  
Moreover, even accepting a strong reading of the Guidelines’ 
requirements,173 the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the 
 
171 Watts, 519 U.S. at 156 (emphasis added). 
172 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006). 
173 See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 441 (1st Cir. 1989) (accepting 
as binding the fact that “Guideline § 1B1.3 requires courts to take account of 
‘relevant conduct’ ”). Wright was later relied upon in Mocciola. United States v. 
Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1989). 
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advisory nature of the Guidelines, post-Booker.  Indeed, in the 
face of judicial hesitancy to depart from the Guidelines, the Court 
has stressed this discretion over and over again, holding three 
times over the last three terms that judges are free to use their 
discretion to depart from the Guidelines, even for policy-based 
reasons.174  In the face of this repeated affirmation of their 
discretion by the Supreme Court, it is unquestionable that judges 
have the discretion to choose not to admit evidence of prior 
acquitted conduct, should they so wish. 
B. Policy Considerations 
In many cases, exercising such restraint would be in 
accordance with sound public policy.  As discussed above, prior 
acquittal sentencing is justified by the truth-seeking function of 
sentencing only in the narrow class of cases in which acquittal 
does not indicate innocence.  It stands to reason, then, that 
judges should take special care to avoid using prior acquitted 
conduct as a sentencing factor in cases outside that narrow class.  
To do so, judges may wish to require independent indicia of 
reliability for all prior acquitted conduct they use at sentencing 
or hold that conduct to a higher standard of proof than the 
“preponderance of the evidence standard” floor required by 
Watts. 
Other considerations, however, argue in favor of judges 
exercising restraint in their use of prior acquitted conduct even 
in the narrow class of cases where they know that a prior 
acquittal does not indicate innocence.  Some of these 
considerations are discussed below.   
The Power of the Probation Officer.  To allow evidence of 
acquitted conduct to be considered “relevant” for purposes of 
sentencing is to give extraordinary power to the person who sets 
down in writing the details of what occurred during the prior 
incident leading to trial and acquittal.  This person, the 
probation officer who assembles the presentence report (“PSR”), 
will often be the only source of information the sentencing judge 
has before him when trying to determine whether the previous 
acquittal is in fact an acquittal on account of innocence or is an 
 
174 See, e.g., Nelson v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 890, 892 (2009); Spears v. United 
States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 843 (2009); United States v. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85, 109–10 
(2007). 
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acquittal based on insufficient evidence to convict the defendant 
of a serious crime, the committing of which speaks to his 
character, his ability to be rehabilitated, and his potential 
dangerousness.175 
While probation officers are criminal justice professionals, 
they are also closely involved in the lives of offenders and their 
communities.176  This connection to the community is beneficial 
in many contexts:  It both allows probation officers to be a 
positive force in offenders’ lives and to obtain more accurate 
information on the offenders and communities their reports 
concern.  Nonetheless, it also engenders the specter of bias born 
of the mixing of personal and professional relationships.  
In addition, the position of probation officer does not require 
the same level of training and educational attainment that our 
society expects from an Article III judge.  In most states and 
jurisdictions, the only educational requirement to work as a 
probation officer is a “bachelor’s degree in social work, criminal 
justice, psychology, or a related field.”177  Undoubtedly, many—if 
not most—probation officers are dedicated and experienced 
professionals. Nevertheless, if we are truly given pause by the 
idea of discretionary sentencing by judges who possess graduate 
degrees and years of experience in sentencing, delegating much 
of that discretionary power to overtaxed officials with less 
training should perhaps give us additional pause. 
The Risk of Unfettered Judicial Discretion.  The Sentencing 
Guidelines were first enacted primarily to counter the problem of 
judicial sentencing discretion so unfettered it was “terrifying and 
intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule of 
 
175 This “problem” is mitigated by the procedural safeguard surrounding 
presentence reports. See Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, under which the 
court is permitted to treat the PSR as its finding of fact, except in the case of material 
subject to the parties’ unresolved objections. These procedural safeguards, however, 
require diligence on the part of the defendant’s attorney. 
176 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2010–
2011 EDITION: PROBATION OFFICERS AND CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT SPECIALISTS 
(2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos265.htm#training (“Probation and 
parole officers supervise offenders on probation or parole through personal contact 
with the offenders and their families. Instead of requiring offenders to come to them, 
many officers meet offenders in their homes and at their places of employment or 
therapy. Probation and parole agencies also seek the assistance of community 
organizations, such as religious institutions, neighborhood groups, and local 
residents, to monitor the behavior of many offenders.”). 
177 Id. 
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law.”178  Marvin Frankel’s definitive work on the topic, Criminal 
Sentences: Law Without Order,179 effectively argued that 
affording unrestrained sentencing discretion to judges resulted in 
both arbitrary sentencing and a wide disparity of sentences being 
imposed on similarly situated defendants.  While allowing judges 
the discretion to decide whether or not to use prior acquitted 
conduct as a sentencing factor would afford them much less 
discretion than that granted to them pre-Guidelines, introducing 
any amount of additional discretion into sentencing potentially 
allows for arbitrary determinations by judges and disparities 
between similarly-situated defendants.180  Indeed, the more 
broadly courts rely on prior acquitted conduct in sentencing, the 
more discretion they have. 
Due Process Concerns.  While sentencing hearings are not 
afforded the full due process protections required at trials,181 
there is nonetheless a strong argument to be made that in an era 
when more than ninety percent of criminal cases end in plea 
bargains182 and when a defendant’s primary day in court, as well 
as the day that determines his fate, is his sentencing hearing, 
due process values should at least guide those hearings.  While 
this concern does not necessary dictate the application of the full 
panoply of due process rights accorded to defendants at trial, it 
may lead judges to consider refraining from the use of prior 
acquitted conduct at sentencing.   
 
178 FRANKEL, supra note 135, at 5. 
179 See generally id. 
180 This problem may have the effect of disproportionately widening racial 
disparities in sentencing. See generally Larry Michael Fehr, Racial and Ethnic 
Disparities in Prosecution and Sentencing: Empirical Research of the Washington 
State Minority and Justice Commission, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 577 (1996); David B. 
Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the 
U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285 (2001); Samuel L. Myers, Jr., Racial 
Disparities in Sentencing: Can Sentencing Reforms Reduce Discrimination in 
Punishment?, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 781 (1993); Douglas Smith, Narrowing Racial 
Disparities in Sentencing Through a System of Mandatory Downward Departures, 2 
AM. U. MOD. AM. 32 (2006). 
181 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251–52 (1949) (allowing extra-trial 
evidence in sentencing hearings); see also United States v. Malouf, 466 F.3d 21, 25 
(1st Cir. 2006) (holding that sentencing factors need only be proved by a 
“preponderance of the evidence” (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 
(1986))). 
182 See Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695, 700 
(2001) (“Despite the fact that there is no right to a negotiated plea, most—if not 
virtually all—criminal cases result in a guilty plea.”). 
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Expressive Meaning of Acquittal.  As discussed above, the 
prior acquittal sentencing regime derives justification from the 
fact that acquittal is not coterminous with a determination of 
innocence.  While this is certainly true as a matter of doctrine,183 
it would come as a surprise to most laymen.  Indeed, there is a 
widely-held public perception that an acquitted defendant has 
been “found innocent,” an opinion that is widely reflected in 
media reporting of trials.184  Challenging a widely held, erroneous 
public perception is certainly not problematic per se; indeed, if 
the Watts decision had encouraged Americans to learn about the 
criminal justice system, it could have constituted a teaching 
moment in American civic literacy.  However, as the public 
perception of acquittal seems not to have changed in the wake of 
the Watts decision,185 the effect of Watts is merely to create 
cognitive dissonance among the American people. 
Insofar as the public is aware of prior acquittal sentencing, 
however, this cognitive dissonance could potentially have several 
deleterious effects on the criminal justice system.  First, by 
allowing a seeming injustice—sentencing a defendant for conduct 
of which he was “innocent”—to be part of the fabric of the law, 
the Watts decision’s admission of prior acquittals in sentencing 
undermines the claim of the criminal justice system to be doing 
justice, and thus its broader legitimacy.  That is, if an onlooker 
sees a defendant sentenced in part for acquitted conduct that the 
onlooker codes as “conduct of which the defendant was innocent,” 
he will assume the criminal justice system is unjust and cease to 
put faith therein.  
Second, this potential cognitive dissonance undermines the 
degree to which an acquittal may have an effect analogous to 
that of “clearing title” in property law.  Because the American 
 
183 See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361 
(1984); see also United States v. Putra, 78 F.3d 1386, 1394 (9th Cir. 1996) (Wallace, 
J., dissenting). 
184 See Joh, supra note 5, at 903 n.87 (“In our system, not only are you presumed 
innocent, but when a jury returns a verdict of not-guilty you are, in fact, innocent.” 
(quoting Peter Neufeld, defense attorney in Simpson trial)); id. at 903 n.88 
(“[William Kennedy] Smith was found innocent . . . .” (quoting Anne Simpson, 
HERALD (Glasgow), May 13, 1997, at 17)); id. at 903 n.89 (“We know that we had the 
trial with Stacy Coons [sic] in the Rodney King incident. And he was found innocent 
the first trial [sic] . . . .” (quoting from the transcript of the Rodney King (Stacy 
Koons) trial)). 
185 See id. at 903 n.87 (citing post-Watts news reports). 
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system has only two verdicts—guilt proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt and guilt not proved beyond a reasonable doubt—both the 
innocent and the guilty whom the prosecution lacked the 
evidence to convict receive the same sentence: acquittal.  
Although some have suggested establishing such an 
institution,186 at present there is no verdict whereby a criminal 
defendant may definitively prove his innocence and have that 
innocence be certified by the state.  Thus, acquittals must be 
used as a proxy for declarations of innocence, lest criminal 
defendants be subject to the stigma of criminality merely by 
being charged with a crime.  Indeed, many courts have gone out 
of their way to stress the degree to which acquittals, whatever 
the legal standard necessary to achieve them, ought to be 
considered declarations of innocence:  
A not guilty judgment is more than a presumption of innocence; 
it is a finding of innocence.  And the courts of this state, 
including this Court, must give exonerative effect to a not guilty 
verdict if anyone is to respect and honor the judgments coming 
out of our criminal justice system.187   
Given, then, that acquittals are the sole manner of “proving” 
innocence in our system, we should pause before blurring the 
innocence-denoting function of acquittals by allow prior acquitted 
conduct to be used in sentencing on the theory that acquittal and 
innocence routinely diverge. 
Undermining General Deterrence as a Rationale for 
Punishment.  In sussing out the Williams Court’s justification for 
its holding, this Article noted above that seeing a defendant 
clearly in his actual behavior and character is necessary for three 
of the purposes of sentencing: rehabilitation, incapacitation, and 
retribution.  In each case, the ability to properly sentence any 
defendant is predicated on the ability to correctly assess the 
defendant’s character and conduct, a necessity that weighs in 
favor of allowing the consideration of some prior acquitted 
conduct.  It is worth noting, however, that in the case of another 
 
186 See generally Samuel Bray, Comment, Not Proven: Introducing a Third 
Verdict, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1299 (2005). Cf. California Seeks Change in Verdict 
Terms, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Sacramento), Jan. 23, 1996 (discussing Senator 
Quentin Kopp’s attempt in 1996 to change acquittal verdicts in California from “not 
guilty” to “not proven guilty” in order to alleviate “confusion”). 
187 McNew v. State, 391 N.E.2d 607, 612 (Ind. 1979). 
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of the Guidelines’ stated goals, deterrence of future crime,188 
additional information about the defendant is not always useful 
useful.  Rather, sentencing a defendant in accord with additional 
information in the form of prior acquitted conduct may actually 
be counter-productive.  
General deterrence differs from the other rationales for 
punishment in that it is ordered not toward how an offender is, 
but toward how he seems.  That is, deterrence works not on 
defendants themselves but on third parties observing them.  The 
theory of deterrence posits that punishing criminals allows them 
to serve as a warning to other criminals, thereby deterring other 
criminals from committing potential crimes.189  In setting 
punishments, deterrence theory invokes a law and economics 
style approach, with analysis mirroring the punitive damages 
analysis used in torts.  That approach presupposes—undoubtedly 
correctly—that the majority of those who commit any given crime 
are not caught.  It argues that this is a problem because, from a 
criminal’s point of view, the expected “value” of committing a 
crime may be higher than that of not committing a crime.  Say, 
for example, that a thief steals cars, the average value of which is 
$10,000, and that it is worth $10,000 to him not to go to jail for 
one year.  If thieves were caught every time they stole, the proper 
deterrent “value” of his sentence would be one year in jail for 
each car he stole.  The deterrence theory of punishment, 
however, posits that the thief will be caught not every time he 
steals, but rather every five times he steals.  As such, it would set 
the punishment for stealing cars at five years in jail, so that it 
would not be “rational” for a thief to steal cars, given the penalty 
he might face if he did.  
The key difference between the deterrence approach to 
punishment and the rehabilitative, retributive, and 
incapacitative theories of punishment is that deterrence is not 
primarily ordered toward or focused on the offender at hand.  On 
 
188 Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 73 Fed. Reg. 26,924 (May 9, 
2008) (“The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Title II of the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act of 1984) provides for the development of guidelines that will further the 
basic purposes of criminal punishment: Deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, 
and rehabilitation.”). 
189 Throughout this Subsection, see generally Dru Stevenson, Toward a New 
Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1535 (2005); Samuel Kramer, 
Comment, An Economic Analysis of Criminal Attempt: Marginal Deterrence and the 
Optimal Structure of Sanctions, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 398 (1991). 
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the rehabilitative model, a defendant is punished with the hope 
of curing him of his deviancy.  On the retributive model, 
punishment serves to make the defendant pay for what he has 
done.  When sentencing with an eye towards incapacitation, a 
judge hopes to keep a dangerous defendant from hurting others.  
On the deterrence theory of punishment, by contrast, the judge 
hopes to deter both the defendant and other members of his 
community who know of his punishment from committing crimes 
in the future.  Punishment is ordered toward changing not only 
the defendant’s behavior, but the behavior of those around him.   
To change a defendant’s behavior, you must understand him; 
you must know how bad he really is.  To change the behavior of 
those around him, you must know how bad he seems.  Thus, for 
the deterrent message to be properly conveyed and received, it 
must be clear for what act the defendant is being punished.  If he 
is punished excessively for some secret fact unknown to the 
outside world, or if his sentence is lessened due to some secret 
aspect of his life the average onlooker could not detect, the value 
of the message conveyed by the deterrence is not only diluted but 
perverted.  The message received by the onlooker will be that 
punishment for the crime at hand is either more or less than it 
really is.   
Due to the popular perception that acquittals are a sure 
indicator of innocence, reliance on prior acquitted conduct as a 
sentencing factor could have the same effect on the deterrent 
value of sentencing that sentencing based on a secret factor 
would.  It would distort the message received by those meant to 
be deterred, encouraging them to think that certain crimes were 
awarded much higher punishments than they actually were.   
This problem, however, is likely not as serious as some of the 
others considered above.  In torts and contract, it is important to 
set the deterrent value carefully so that it neither under-deters, 
allowing undesirable tort-causing and contract-breaching to 
occur, nor over-deters, allowing sensitive plaintiffs to put the 
kibosh on nuisances that are benign in society’s eyes or 
preventing efficient breach.190  By contrast, in the context of the 
 
190 Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic 
Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284 (1970) (“Repudiation of obligations should be 
encouraged where the promisor is able to profit from his default after placing his 
promisee in as good a position as he would have occupied had performance been 
rendered.”). See generally Charles G. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, 
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criminal law, it seems that there is no such thing as over-
deterring crime; crime is both per se bad for society as well as 
inefficient.  It is certainly possible to over-punish an offender by 
meting out to him more punishment than he deserves in justice.  
It is not, on the other hand, possible to over-deter onlookers by 
making punishment seem too disproportionate—within reason.191  
Moreover, unlike tort or contract scenarios, where it is easy to 
put a price tag on the imposition of a nuisance or the breach of a 
contract, in the criminal sphere there is, in most cases, no one-
size-fits-all equation between offenses and the severity of 
punishment imposed for them.  Consider for example, the 
extreme sentencing disparities for the same crime between the 
United States and Europe.192  As such, the worry about over-
deterrence of crime seems to mistake how finely tuned the 
matching of punishments to deterrence of crime in fact is. 
While such considerations must be carefully balanced 
against the advantages of prior acquittal sentencing in cases 
where acquittal does not indicate innocence—namely, the good of 
sentencing offenders accurately in accordance with their true 
character—they are nonetheless worthy of consideration in any 
judge’s decision of how to exercise discretion most wisely in the 
wake of Booker.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has traced the history of prior acquittal 
sentencing from its foreshadowing in the 1949 Williams decision 
through the two legislative interventions of § 3577 and the 
Sentencing Guidelines to its ultimate legitimization as 
permissible practice in the 1997 Watts decision.  From that 
history, several themes and conclusions have emerged. 
First, sometimes less is more.  The Williams decision’s 
minimalist holding provided that the use of extra-trial 
 
Penalties, and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement 
Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977). 
191 Certainly, if the populace perceived that brutally harsh punishments were 
meted out for minor infractions, the expressive value of that punishment could 
produce barbarism—or revolt.  
192 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations’, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at A1 (“Americans are locked up for crimes—from writing bad 
checks to using drugs—that would rarely produce prison sentences in other 
countries. And in particular they are kept incarcerated far longer than prisoners in 
other nations.”). 
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information at sentencing was not a per se violation of the Due 
Process Clause.  The limited guidance offered by that holding, 
combined with the example offered by the Court in its own 
decisionmaking process, engendered progeny like United States 
v. Sweig.  Sweig carefully reasoned that prior acquittal 
sentencing should be permitted only in the narrow class of cases 
where acquittal does not indicate innocence and, thus, where 
prior acquitted conduct reveals elements of the defendant’s 
character useful to the sentencing judge.  Following Williams’s 
example, the Sweig court considered various indicia of reliability 
in deciding whether prior acquitted conduct should be used at 
sentencing.  
Section 3577 provided a useful foil to the Williams Court’s 
minimalism, mandating that no limitation be put on the 
information a sentencing judge was allowed to consider.  
Motivated by concern for the manner in which trials had been 
driven away from truth-seeking by mafia manipulation and the 
criminal procedure reforms of the Warren Court, Congress 
intervened in categorical language.  In doing so, it effectively 
insulated judges from reversal for sentencing defendants based 
on their prior acquitted conduct.  As prior acquittal sentencing 
cases decided under § 3577 demonstrate, providing judges with a 
bright-line resolution to a complicated issue sometimes 
engenders mechanization without understanding.  Indeed, in 
cases like United States v. Plisek, courts would have benefited 
from the deliberation-forcing aspect of Williams’s ambiguity.  
Performing the intellectual heavy-lifting of thinking through the 
justifications for prior acquittal sentencing would have forced the 
Plisek court to understand the boundaries of the narrow class of 
cases in which prior acquittal sentencing was justified. 
That mechanization was later systematized and 
universalized with the promulgation of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, which incorporated § 3577, thereby placing prior 
acquitted conduct in the category of “relevant information” 
judges were bound to consider at sentencing.  Guidelines cases 
would betray a mechanical application of § 3577’s admission of 
prior acquitted conduct with very little exercise of discretion.  
With the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Booker and 
Watts, however, discretion is again at the fore.  Under Booker, 
the Guidelines are no longer mandatory on judges.  Under Watts, 
prior acquittal sentencing is permitted but not mandated, and a 
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hard floor of reliability is established in the form of the 
requirement that prior acquitted conduct be proved to a 
preponderance of the evidence.  The degree to which that 
discretion is exercised by judges now accustomed to minimally 
discretionary Guidelines sentencing remains to be seen. 
Second, while prior acquittal sentencing is logically justified 
in a narrow class of cases, it may be imprudent even in those 
cases.  Consideration of prior acquittal sentencing’s history 
allows us to formulate a recommendation on how best to exercise 
that discretion.  As we have seen, decisions like Williams, Sweig, 
and Watts provide the makings of a strong logical argument in 
favor of the use of prior acquitted conduct as a sentencing factor 
in certain cases.  Those cases argue compellingly that 
sentencing’s goals differ from those of trials.  Unlike trials, 
sentencings must strive above all for clarity.  The sentencing 
judge must see the defendant as he truly is in order to sentence 
him justly in accordance with the gravity of his crime and in 
order to know whether and to what degree incapacitation is 
necessary.  To the degree a sentencing judge is sub silentio 
relying on a defendant’s potential for rehabilitation, accurate 
knowledge of his character is equally necessary.  Because 
acquittal indicates not innocence but an inability by the 
prosecution to prove each element of the case against the 
defendant, there exists a narrow class of cases in which a 
convicted defendant was previously acquitted of a crime he had 
actually committed.  In that narrow class of cases, consideration 
of prior acquitted conduct will allow that defendant to be 
sentenced more accurately, particularly given the high probative 
value recidivism holds in demonstrating a defendant’s character.  
However, winnowing the class of defendants with prior 
acquittals down to those previously convicted of a crime they 
actually committed is a difficult task.  To accomplish that task, 
courts should, at the very least, exercise the discretion granted 
them by law to require external indicia of reliability before 
relying on evidence of prior acquitted conduct.  Further, they 
should consider requiring a more stringent level of proof than a 
mere preponderance of the evidence.  Finally, before admitting 
evidence of prior acquitted conduct even in that narrow class of 
cases, courts should think seriously about the compelling public 
policy reasons for not engaging in prior acquittal sentencing.  
Those include the risk of undermining the expressive meaning of 
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acquittal, of spoiling the deterrence function of sentencing, or of 
according too much power and discretion to probation officers 
and judges.  While not necessarily determinative, those factors 
should be taken into account by judges in deciding how best to 
reassert their rediscovered discretion.  
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APPENDIX 
CASES ADDRESSING THE PERMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR 
ACQUITTAL SENTENCING 
 
*  Court found for defendant, excluding prior acquitted 
conduct at sentencing 
~  Case too idiosyncratic or vague to reliably include in 
statistics 
 
Cases Decided Before October 14, 1970
(Prior to § 3577)
1 
~United States v. Castaldi, 338 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 
1964). 
  
Cases Decided October 14, 1970–November 1, 1987
(Post-§ 3577, Pre-Guidelines)
1 
United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 
1972). 
2 
United States v. Atkins, 480 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 
1973). 
3 
~United States v. Avery, 473 F. Supp. 980 (S.D. 
Fla. 1979).
4 
United States v. Morgan, 595 F.2d 1134 (9th Cir. 
1979). 
5 
~United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 
1981). 
6 
United States v. Plisek, 657 F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 
1981). 
7 
United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982).
8 
United States v. Bernard, 757 F.2d 1439 (4th Cir. 
1985). 
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Cases Decided November 1, 1987–January 6, 1997
(Post-Guidelines, Pre-Watts)
1 
United States v. Perez, 858 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 
1988). 
2 
United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 
1989). 
3 
United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d 747 
(5th Cir. 1989).
4 
United States v. Isom, 886 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 
1989). 
5 
United States v. Ford, 889 F.2d 1570 (6th Cir. 
1989). 
6 Delap v. Dugger, 890 F.2d 285 (11th Cir. 1989). 
7 
United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 
1989). 
8 
United States v. Funt, 896 F.2d 1288 (11th Cir. 
1990). 
9 
United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 
177 (2d Cir. 1990).
10 
United States v. Vandervelden, No. 89-1345, 
1990 WL 51380 (6th Cir. Apr. 23, 1990).
11 
United States v. Duncan, 918 F.2d 647 (6th Cir. 
1990). 
12 
Stewart v. Roland, No. 89-15936, 1990 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 22101 (9th Cir. Dec. 18, 1990).
13 
United States v. Bertucci, 730 F. Supp. 1483 
(E.D. Wis. 1990).
14 
United States v. Averi, 922 F.2d 765 (11th Cir. 
1991). 
15 
*United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 
1991). 
16 
United States v. Rivera-Lopez, 928 F.2d 372 
(11th Cir. 1991).
17 
United States v. Lawrence, 934 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 
1991). 
18 
United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226 (11th Cir. 
1991). 
19 
United States v. Slow Bear, 943 F.2d 836 (8th 
Cir. 1991).
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20 
Moreno v. United States, No. 91-1572, 1991 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 22705 (6th Cir. Sept. 23, 1991).
21 
United States v. Romulus, 949 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 
1991). 
22 
United States v. Ailemen, No. 90-10375, 1991 
U.S. App. LEXIS 30312 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 1991). 
24 
United States v. Blyden, 964 F.2d 1375 (3d Cir. 
1992). 
25 
United States v. Vineyard, Nos. 91-5173, 5174, 
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14737 (4th Cir. June 24, 
1992). 
26 
United States v. Fields, No. 91-1910, 1992 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 8770 (1st Cir. Feb. 26, 1992).
27 
United States v. Martin, No. 91-4076, 1992 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 18516 (6th Cir. July 28, 1992).
28 
United States v. Hasting, Nos. 91-6234, 6311, 
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 21595 (6th Cir. Sept. 1, 
1992). 
29 
United States v. Neris, No. 91-5391, 1992 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 22188 (4th Cir. Sept. 11, 1992).
30 
United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502 (6th 
Cir. 1992).
31 
United States v. Martin, No. 91-4076, 1992 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 26283 (6th Cir. Oct. 7, 1992).
32 
United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 
1992). 
33 
United States v. Cheatham, Nos. 91-5195, 5199, 
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 30857 (4th Cir. Nov. 23, 
1992). 
34 
United States v. August, 984 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 
1992). 
35 
United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369 (2d 
Cir. 1992).
36 
United States v. McIntosh, Nos. 91-6236, 6284, 
6283, 6282, 6240, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 34839 
(6th Cir. Dec. 29, 1992).
37 
United States v. Smith, No. 92-5005, 1992 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 33988 (4th Cir. Dec. 30, 1992).
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38 
United States ex rel. Jackson v. Roth, No. 93 C 
2281, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11852 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 
26, 1993). 
39 
United States v. Bennett, 984 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 
1993). 
40 
*United States v. Walsh, No. 92-10118, 1993 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 1689 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 1993).
41 
United States v. Kelly, 1 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 
1993). 
42 
United States v. Eliason, 3 F.3d 1149 (7th Cir. 
1993). 
43 
United States v. Nelson, 6 F.3d 1049 (4th Cir. 
1993). 
44 DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 6 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 1993). 
45 
United States v. Garcia, 987 F.2d 1459 (10th Cir. 
1993). 
46 
United States v. Spencer, No. 93-5112, 1993 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 28854 (4th Cir. Nov. 5, 1993).
47 
United States v. Nyhuis, 8 F.3d 731 (11th Cir. 
1993). 
48 
United States v. Stanley, 12 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 
1993). 
49 
United States v. Carreon, 11 F.3d 1225 (5th Cir. 
1994). 
50 
United States v. Pinkney, 15 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
51 
United States v. Emerson, No. 93-6064, 1994 
U.S. App. LEXIS 1692 (10th Cir. Feb. 3, 1994). 
52 
United States v. Parham, 16 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 
1994). 
53 
United States v. Hunter, 19 F.3d 895 (4th Cir. 
1994). 
54 
United States v. Fankhauser, No. 93-5288, 1994 
U.S. App. LEXIS 3521 (4th Cir. Mar. 1, 1994). 
55 
United States v. Foster, 19 F.3d 1452 (D.C. Cir. 
1994). 
56 
United States v. Estevez, No. 93-3763, 1994 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 11751 (6th Cir. May 18, 1994).
57 
United States v. Roper, No. 93-3592, 1994 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 14346 (6th Cir. June 7, 1994).
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62 
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1994). 
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64 
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65 
United States v. Frias, 39 F.3d 391 (2d Cir. 
1994). 
66 
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67 
United States v. Powell, 487 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 
1973). 
68 
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